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SECURITIES REGULATION REFORM: PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE
Although our markets are still flourishing and continue to be the best in
the world, the securities industry is beset with a myriad of problems which,
if not solved, could have a severe impact on the continued viability of our
financial marketplace. What is of particular concern is the way we are
attempting to deal with them. In many instances, we seem to be just
watching these problems as they erode the confidence of investors and the
integrity of our great system. In other instances, we are dealing with Band
Aid solutions. Much more is required.,
INTRODUCTION
Over fifty years ago, a national emergency presented the need and op-
portunity for a scheme of federal securities regulation. Hurried and uncoor-
dinated recovery-oriented legislation created an inefficient patchwork of laws
which to this day remains in substantially the same basic form as when
enacted. 2 Although such legislation may have been adequate at the time,
there have been significant changes in the securities industry and the capital
markets which indicate a need for changes in the securities laws. These
changes are needed to protect the continued vitality of the U.S. markets in
a global environment. The capital markets have become more volatile and
international in scope, and there have been major changes in capital allo-
cation, the types of securities offered and distribution techniques.3 In order
to compete in the international capital markets and provide for the optimum
allocation of resources in the U.S. capital markets, the scheme of federal
securities regulation must adapt to the realities of the current market and
the indications of modern economic theory.
A major problem in securities regulation continues to be the duplicative
nature of the securities laws, despite ,he lgenefits of the integrated disclosure
1. Speech by U.S. District Judge Stanley Sporkin, former head SEC Enforcement Division,
Nat'l Law J., Dec. 8, 1986, at 5, col. 3.
2. "The securities laws, however, have retained not only their support but also their
structure. They had and still have two basic components: a prohibition against fraud, and
requirements of disclosure when securities are issued and periodically thereafter." Easterbrook
& Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984).
3. [T]he markets have changed in two important ways. The proliferation of new
types of securities and distribution techniques has put increasing pressure on the
1933 Act listing of 'exempt securities' and 'exempt transactions,' while developing
internationalization of the securities markets has created tension between the reg-
ulated domestic market and the 'unregulated' Eurodollar market.
McLaughlin, 1933 Act's Registration Provisions: Is Time Ripe for Repealing Them?, Nat'l Law
J., Aug. 18, 1986, at 44, col. 1.
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system. 4 For example, the Securities Act of 1933 regulates particular offerings
of securities in the primary securities markets while the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 regulates securities in the secondary trading markets. The two
Acts contain different or redundant disclosure requirements, conflicting
liability provisions and inconsistent filing requirements and procedures.'
Another major problem of securities regulation is its continued emphasis on
the scheme and premises of the original legislation, disregarding modern
economic theory and circumstances. 6 For instance, the goal of disclosure for
the individual investor continues to be paramount even though individual
investors do not use such disclosures, relying instead on financial interme-
diaries and an efficient capital market.' These and other problems can best
be rendered intelligible with a background of the federal securities laws and
a chronicle of the events that shaped them.
I. FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION
Federal securities law is largely a patchwork of six statutes enacted between
1933 and 1940, and one enacted in 1970, as amended. The first statute, the
Securities Act of 1933,8 essentially mandated disclosure and created antifraud
provisions in the initial distribution of securities. The Securities Act of 1934, 9
4. See infra notes 167-99 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 245-81 and accompanying text.
6. See id.
In summary, the Commission's disclosure system cannot be given high marks either
for performance or on a cost/benefit basis during its first forty years. The system
was founded not on disclosure of 'all material facts,' but on disclosure of events
in the past which the Commission could objectively verify. This historical perspective
was assumed for the inefficient purpose of preventing blatant securities fraud . . .
and for the less apparent purpose of protecting the Commission from criticism for
issues that turn sour .... In recent years, while the Commission has shown
commendable willingness to try to modernize the system, developments and eco-
nomic theory have outrun adaptation of tie system. A large apparatus of disclosure
which serves little purpose still remains. The disclosure mandated for large companies
by the Securities Act does not reach the public in any more useful fashion than the
same information already reaches the public through the companies' reports to
stockholders and the Securities Exchange Act disclosure system. The purpose of
mandated disclosure, when so many investment decisions turn on subjective factors
dependent on each investor's time frame and portfolio position, has not been
completely thought through . . . . The 1933 Act and the purposes of mandated
disclosure need fundamental rethinking as we embark on a new fifty years; however,
signs that this rethinking is in process are not visible.
Kripke, Fifty Years of Securities Regulation in Search of a Purpose, 21 SAN DIEo L. REV.
257, 276-77 (1984).
7. See infra notes 200-43 and accompanying text.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982 & Supp. 111 1985) [hereinafter the 1933 Act]. See infra
notes 15-56 and accompanying text.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. III 1985) [hereinafter the 1934 Act]. See infra
notes 57-86 and accompanying text.
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a more comprehensive act, regulated the secondary securities markets and
dealt with other aspects of the securities industry. The remaining statutes
apply to narrower concerns of the securities industry. The Trust Indenture
Act of 193910 requires the qualification of trust indentures, even for trust
indentures of securities qualified under the Securities Act of 1933. The
Investment Company Act of 194011 governs investment companies and the
Investment Advisers Act of 194012 regulates covered investment advisers. The
Securities Investor Protection Act of 197013 establishes the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation for the protection of customers of certain broker-
dealers who encounter financial difficulties. The largely obsolete Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 193514 completes the patchwork of federal
securities regulation. This Comment will focus on the 1933 and 1934 Acts
since they are the principal federal statutes which address securities regula-
tion.
The key substantive provision of the 1933 Act is Section 515 which provides
that no security may be offered to the public via the mails or interstate
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
11. Id. §§ 80a-I to 80a-64 (1982 & Supp. I1 1985).
12. Id. 99 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985). "The Investment Advisers Act of 1940
was the last in a series of Acts designed to eliminate certain abuses in the securities industry,
abuses which were found to have contributed to the stock market crash of 1929 and the
depression of the 1930's." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186
(1963).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
14. Id. § 79 to 79z-6 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). "The Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935 'authorized and directed' the Securities and Exchange Commission 'to make a study
of the functions and activities of investment trusts and investment companies .... .' " Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 187.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 5 is the heart of the 1933 Act:
Section 5. (a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall
be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or
medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry out or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce,
by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose
of sale or for delivery after sale.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any prospectus relating
to any security with respect to which a registration statement has been filed under
this title, unless such prospectus meets the requirements of section 10; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce any
such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, unless accompanied
or preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements of subsection (a) of section
10.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any
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commerce unless a registration statement has been filed with the Securities
Exchange Commission. 6 Section 5 also prohibits any sale to the public unless
this registration statement has become effective. An offer for the sale of
securities in violation of Section 5 gives the investor a right to rescind the
contract or sale.' 7 The form and content of the registration statement is
prescribed by the 1933 Act and SEC rules thereunder. These rules require
that the registration statement contain certain exhibits and the issuer's pro-
spectus."8 The prospectus 9 must contain all information material to investors
deciding whether or not to purchase the securities offered. Section 1020 of
the 1933 Act, along with specific rules and forms issued by the SEC, prescribe
the disclosures required. Section 521 of the 1933 Act prohibits the delivery
of securities through the mails or interstate commerce unless preceded or
accompanied by this statutorily prescribed prospectus.
prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed
as to such security ....
Id.
Generally, § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 'forbids the use of any means of
interstate commerce or of the mails to sell or offer to sell securities without having
first filed a registration statement with the [SEC].'
However, this 'broad and all-encompassing prohibition ... must be read in
conjunction with the claimed exemptions which are in the nature of exceptions to
the overriding purposes of the Act.' The Securities Act of 1933 'carefully exempts
from its application certain types of securities transactions where there is no practical
need for its application or where the benefits are too remote.'
SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. of South Carolina, 463 F.2d 137, 155 (5th Cir. 1972) (citations
omitted).
16. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established by section 4 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1982 & Supp. III 1985). "The Commission
is charged with the duty of enforcing the [1933 Act] in the 'public interest,' a mandate which
necessarily 'gives the Commission broad discretion'. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 141
(2d Cir. 1963).
17. Securities Act of 1933, § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See Kilmartin
v. H.C. Wainwright & Co., 580 F. Supp. 604, 607-08 (D. Mass. 1984).
18. Securities Act of 1933, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
19. "Prospectus" is defined in § 2(10) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10)
(1982 & Supp. III 1985).
The objective of a prospectus is to solicit investment by the general public. Man-
datory registration of such materials with the SEC is intended to ensure that the
factors entering into prudent investment decisions are depicted in a standardized,
comprehensible, and accurate manner. Thus, the intended audience will be extremely
broad, encompassing both sophisticated financial analysts and untutored lay persons.
As the principal goal of the Securities Act is disclosure, SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 ... (1963), close questions will generally
be resolved in favor of the inclusion of information.
Given these factors, disclosure in a prospectus must steer a middle course, neither
submerging a material fact in a flood of collateral data, nor slighting its importance
through seemingly cavalier treatment. The import of the information conveyed must
be neither oversubtle nor overplayed, its meaning accurate, yet accessible.
Greenapple v. Detroit Edison Co., 618 F.2d 198, 210 (2d Cir. 1980).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
21. Id. § 77e(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. II 1985):
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Technically, it is an "issue" or offering of securities which is registered
rather than the security itself. Thus, unless an exemption is available, a
purchaser, in many cases, is required to file a second registration statement
under the Act in order to publicly resell the securities. The 1933 Act,
therefore, creates a static registration and disclosure system for securities
which is dependent upon the event of an offering or issue. The 1933 Act,
however, provides exemptions for certain securities and transactions in se-
curities.
The 1933 Act exempts two categories of securities from registration.
Certain types of securities are deemed exempt in and of themselves under
Section 3,22 and Section 423 exempts certain specified transactions. Section 3
authorizes the SEC to exempt securities offered up to an aggregate of $5
million pursuant to a rule or regulation, 24 in addition to the securities
specifically enumerated in that section. Under this authority, the SEC has
adopted Regulations A 21 and D.26 Regulation A, which exempts up to $1.5
million of securities sold by an issuer during a twelve month period, is
available only if the issuer complies with certain simplified registration
procedures. 27 Regulation D consists of three substantive rules including: Rule
504 which permits an issuer to sell $500,000 of securities to any number of
purchasers in a twelve month period; 2 Rule 505 which provides that $5
million in securities may be issued without registration to an unlimited
number of "accredited" investors and to thirty-five other persons; 29 and
Rule 506, promulgated under Section 4, which is discussed below. 0
Section 3 also exempts securities which are part of an issue offered and
sold only to persons resident within a single state or territory. However, as
interpreted, the issuer must be a resident of and doing substantial business
only in that state.3 The SEC has created a safe harbor provision for intrastate
offerings in Rule 147.32
Section 4(2), 33 the private placement exemption, affects transactions by an
issuer that do not involve a public offering. Rule 506, under Regulation D,
provides a safe harbor for such offerings.3 4 This rule allows sales of an
22. Id. § 77c (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
23. Id. § 77d (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
24. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
25. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.63 (1987).
26. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.06 (1987). See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 25.
28. Securities Act Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1987).
29. Securities Act Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1987).
30. See infra note 34.
31. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(11) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See
SEC v. McDonald Inv. Co., 343 F. Supp. 343 (D. Minn. 1972).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1986).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119 (1953) (discussing private placement exemption).
34. Securities Act Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1987).
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unlimited dollar amount of securities to any number of accredited investors
and thirty-five other purchasers, similar to Rule 505 offerings. These non-
accredited purchasers or their representatives, however, must be financially
sophisticated so as to avoid having the offering deemed public.3 5
Section 4(1),36 known as the resale exemption, contains the most commonly
used transaction exemption. This section exempts transactions by any person
other than the issuer, underwriter or dealer. 3 This exemption also allows
the ordinary investor to resell securities purchased on the open market.
Absent such an exemption, the resale would have to be registered under the
1933 Act since the issuer's registration statement would have covered only
the initial offering of the securities.
Violation of the 1933 Act may result in civil"' or criminal39 liability. Section
12(1)40 provides that any person who offers or sells a security in violation
of Section 5 shall be liable to the purchaser for damages. Section 12(1) also
provides for an automatic right of rescission. Liability attaches to any person
who violates Section 5 by selling, for instance, unregistered securities or
failing to deliver a prospectus.4' This section requires the seller and dealer
to be in privity.42 Whether or not such securities must be registered under
Section 5, Section 12(2)43 establishes civil liability for material omissions or
misstatements in any offer or sale of securities. Scienter of the seller and
privity by the purchaser must be shown under Section 12(2)."
Section 1141 of the 1933 Act, together with Section 12, provides an intended
in terrorem"6 scheme of civil liability. First, it imposes absolute liability on
the issuer of securities for any material defects in the registration statement. 47
"Neither proof of good faith nor a lack of negligence frees the issuer if
there is a material mistatement [sic] or omission. There is absolute liability,
subject only to the defense of truth. '4
35. Id.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
37. Id.
38. See infra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
39. Securities Act of 1933, § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
41. See, e.g., Diskin v. Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871, 876 (2d Cir. 1971) (violation of
Section 5(b)(1) prospectus delivery requirement).
42. See Winter v. D.J. & M. Inv. & Constr. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
44. See Franklin Sav. Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1977); Wilko v.
Swan, 127 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
46. "The civil liabilities imposed by the Act are not only compensatory in nature but also
in terrorem (footnote omitted). They have been set high to guarantee that the risk of their
invocation will be effective in assuring that the 'truth about securities' will be told." Douglas
& Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 173 (1933).
47. Securities Act of 1933, § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
48. Kripke, Securities Law Reform and the ALI Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MLAMn L.
REV. 1453, 1459 (1979).
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[S]ection 11 of the 1933 Act allows purchasers of a registered security to
sue certain enumerated parties in a registered offering when false or
misleading information is included in a registration statement. The section
was designed to assure compliance with the disclosure provisions of the
Act by imposing a stringent standard of liability on the parties who play
a direct role in a registered offering. If a plaintiff purchases a security
issued pursuant to a registration statement, he need only show a material
mistatement [sic] or omission to establish his prima facie case. Liability
against the issuer is virtually absolute, even for innocent mistatements [sic]
(footnote omitted). 9
The only defenses available to the issuer are purchaser's knowledge of the
defects, lack of materiality or expiration of the statute of limitations.50
Second, Section 11 imposes liability upon other persons for negligence unless
they are able to establish due diligence and reasonable investigation." The
persons liable include signatories of the registration statement, present and
prospective directors of the issuers, underwriters and certain experts involved
in the registration statement.52
Section 11 remedies are available only to the purchaser whose securities
"trace back" to those sold under the registration statement.5 1 In addition,
Section 13 provides for a short statute of limitations which bars suits brought
after one year from discovery of a defect or three years from the date the
issue was first offered.5 4
Section 1715 of the 1933 Act contains a general antifraud provision that
supplements Section 5 and the express civil liability provisions. This section
prohibits fraud, material misstatements and omissions of fact in connection
with the sale of securities. Section 17 applies whether or not the securities
are registered or exempt from registration. The courts are divided on whether
Section 17 allows an implied private remedy.5 6
49. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1983) (footnote omitted).
50. T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 191 (1985). See Feit v. Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 568-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). For additional sources discussing Escott and Section
11 liabilities, see Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case,
55 VA. L. REV. 1 (1969); Heller, Weiss, Israels & Schwartz, BarChris: A Dialogue on a Bad
Case Making Hard Law, 57 GEO. L.J. 221 (1968); Note, Escott v. BarChris: "Reasonable
Investigation" and Prospectus Liability Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 82
HARV. L. REV. 908 (1969).
51. Securities Act of 1933, § ll(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The
most definitive and comprehensive case on the topic of Section 11 liability and the defenses of
due diligence and reasonable investigation is Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp.
643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See infra note 50.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
53. See Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028, 1033 (D. Minn. 1981);
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 257 F. Supp. 875, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
54. Securities Act of 1933, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See Cook v.
Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1978).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
56. For cases holding for an implied private remedy, see Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers
19881
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In contrast to the focus on issuers and the static registration scheme of
the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act5 7 is a much more comprehensive act which
regulates securities in the secondary markets and deals with all aspects of
the securities industry. The 1934 Act imposes registration and reporting
requirements upon issuers of certain securities," national securities ex-
changes,5 9 self-regulatory organizations, 60 and others. Section 12(a) of the
1934 Act 61 requires registration with the SEC of securities traded on a national
exchange. Section 12(g)(1) 62 and SEC Rule 12g-1 63 require SEC registration
of over-the-counter equity securities having more than five hundred share-
holders and more than $5 million in total assets. In addition, Section 15(d) 64
requires that issuers, required to register under the 1933 Act, file with the
SEC all the periodic reports required by Section 1365 of the 1934 Act.
Section 13 of the 1934 Act and the accompanying rules" require issuers
of securities registered under the Act to file annual, 67 quarterly68 and current 69
reports with the SEC, as well as other reports in certain circumstances. 70
II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1981); Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979). But see Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th
Cir. 1982); In re Catenello and E.F. Hutton & Co. Sec. Litigation, 583 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D.
Pa. 1984); Sweeney v. Keystone Provident Life Ins. Co., 578 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1983).
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
58. Id. § 781(g)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
59. Id. §§ 78f, 78q, 78s (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
60. Id. § 78o-3 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). There are four types of self-regulatory organizations:
the national securities exchanges, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (a registered
securities association), registered clearing agencies and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(26), 15 U.S.C. § 78b(a)(26) (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
61. Id. § 781(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
62. Id. § 781(g)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This statute requiring registration of over-the-
counter securities was added in 1964. Securities Act Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
467, 78 Stat. 565 (1964). See infra note 108 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
Securities Act Amendments of 1964, see Meeker, Extending Disclosure to Nonlisted Companies,
20 Bus. LAW. 265 (1965); Owens, Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 38 OKLA. B.A.J. 1121
(1967); Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 1964
DUKE L.J. 706; Sargent, The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964: Background Effect and
Practicalities, 20 Sw. L.J. 434 (1966); Sowards, The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964: New
Registration and Reporting Requirements, 19 U. MiAMI L. REV. 33 (1964).
63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1986). The Securities Act Amendments of 1964, supra note 62,
required registration of companies with assets of more than $1 million. The SEC under this
rule has exempted issuers with assets under $5 million.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The periodic reporting requirements are
suspended in any year in which the securities issued, pursuant to registration under the Securities
Act of 1933, are held by less than three hundred shareholders. Id.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
66. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1 to 13a-17 (1987).
67. Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (1987).
68. Form 10-Q, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 (1987).
69. Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (1987).
70. Regulation 13A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13q-1 (1987) & Regulation 15D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-
1(1987).
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Furthermore, beyond the periodic reporting requirements, registration under
the 1934 Act triggers other disclosure provisions. Section 14(a), 71 for example,
requires the filing of proxy material with the SEC. Further reporting re-
quirements also exist for tender offers,72 transactions of insiders73 and pur-
chasers of five percent of any class of registered securities. 74
Several sections of the 1934 Act impose civil and criminal liability for
violations of the Act's substantive provisions. Section 18(a) 75 imposes liability
upon anyone responsible for material misstatements or omissions of fact in
any document which is required to be filed with the SEC under the 1934
Act. This section provides that any person who makes a false or misleading
statement in a filing is liable to:
any person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading)
who, in reliance on such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security
at a price which was affected by such statement ... unless the person
sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that
such statement was false or misleading.76
Practically, Section 18 does not provide a viable remedy for 1934 Act
violations because of several burdens of proof placed on the plaintiff and
the good faith and other defenses available to the defendant. 77 The limitations
of Section 18 suits have led plaintiffs to seek recovery under Section 10(b)
of the Act and SEC Rule l0b-578 for alleged violations of the 1934 Act.
Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.19
In contrast to the in terrorem liability provisions of the 1933 Act, 0 a
remedy under the 1934 Act generally requires a showing of scienter. 18 Thus,
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See Rule 14a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a)
(1987).
72. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
73. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
74. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1982 & Supp. II 1985).
76. Id.
77. See Greene, Investment Bankers: Determining the Responsibilities of Underwriters Dis-
tributing Securities Within an Integrated Disclosure System, 56 NOTRE DAsME L. REV. 755, 758
(1981).
78. Id.
79. Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
80. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
81. Although the extensive legislative history of the 1934 Act is bereft of any explicit
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the plaintiff must prove that the defendant either knew the statement was
false or misleading or that the defendant acted with a reckless disregard for
its truth or falsity. s2
Section 11 places a relatively minimal burden on a plaintiff. In contrast,
Section 10(b) is a 'catchall' antifraud provision, but it requires a plaintiff
to carry a heavier burden to establish a cause of action. While a Section
11 action must be brought by a purchaser of a registered security, must
be based on misstatements or omissions in a registration statement, and
can only be brought against certain parties, a Section 10(b) action can be
brought by a purchaser or seller of 'any security' against 'any person'
who has used 'any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance' in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(emphasis added). However, a Section 10(b) plaintiff carries a heavier
burden than a Section 11 plaintiff. Most significantly, he must prove that
the defendant acted with scienter, i.e., with intent to deceive, manipulate
or defraud.,,
In addition to Sections 18 and 10(b), other provisions of Section 10 along
with Sections 9 and 15 prohibit fraudulent and manipulative practices in
certain narrowly defined circumstances. Section 914 outlaws manipulative
practices in securities trading on a national exchange and provides a private
remedy for investors injured by such conduct. Section 10(a) s5 prohibits short
sales and stop order loss orders in violation of SEC rules. Section 15(c) 86
prohibits brokers and dealers from participating in manipulative, deceptive
or fraudulent acts and practices in connection with sales, or attempts to
induce sales of securities.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECURITIES REGULATION
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were
generally regarded as responses to abuses in the securities industry which
were believed to be partially responsible for the stock market crash of 1929
and the subsequent depression. 7 The prosperity and rising stock market of
explanation of Congress' intent, we think the relevant portions of that history
support our conclusions that §10(b) was addressed to practices that involve some
element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negligent conduct
alone.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976). Cf. Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341,
346 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("scienter is not an element of a Section 11 action").
82. See supra note 77.
83. Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 (1983).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1982 & Supp. I 1985).
85. Id. § 78j(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
86. Id. § 78o(c) (1982 & Supp. IIl 1985).
87. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was the last in a series of Acts designed to
eliminate certain abuses in the securities industry, abuses which were found to have
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the 1920s brought many new investors into the market. This growth was
encouraged by the securities industry through aggressive advertising and
promotion, high pressure sales tactics and the encouragement of high fi-
nancing by speculation on margin. The increase in investors and demand
further increased stock prices. Public expectation that the market would
advance indefinitely was shattered in the October 1929 stock market crash.
In the following five years, the securities market suffered great outflows of
capital due to the lack of investor confidence. The declining demand for
securities led to a further decline in prices 8
Some believed that the great drop in security value was the result of a
failure to tell the "truth about securities." 9 The congressional hearings
disclosed many instances of fraudulent and unethical conduct by the securities
industry including manipulation of stock prices, conflict of interests, self-
dealing, overinflated claims of issuers, and misleading, fraudulent, or in-
adequate disclosures. The hearings indicted the entire securities industry for
its failure to fulfill the fiduciary standards that governed the conduct of
those handling other peoples' money. There was also a perceived failure of
both state regulation and industry self regulation. 9°
contributed to the stock market crash of 1929 and the depression of the 1930s. It
was preceded by the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
the Public Utility Holding Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, and the
Investment Company Act of 1940.
Id.
88. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1933); S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
1 (1933). See J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET-A HISTORY OF THE SECU-
RITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN FINANCE 1-3 (1982); Anderson, The Disclosure
Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 314 (1974).
From 1920 to 1933 some $50 billion of securities were sold in the United States.
By 1933 half were worthless. In 1934, the American public also held over $8 billion
of foreign securities, of which $6 billion had been sold in the years 1923 to 1930.
By March, 1934, $3 billion were in default. The aggregate value of all stocks listed
on the New York Stock Exchange on September 1, 1929 was $89 billion. In 1932,
the aggregate figure was down to $15 billion-a loss of $74 billion in two and one-
half years. The bond losses increased the total drop in values to $93 billion.
1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 120 (2d ed. 1961). See also United States v. Morgan, 118
F. Supp. 621, 635-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (historical perspective of securities industry and laws in
connection with investment banking business). The stock market also "crashed" on October
19, 1987. "The Dow Jones Industrial Average plummeted an astonishing 508 points, or 22.6076,
to 1738.74. The drop far exceeded the 12.8% decline on the day of Oct. 28, 1929, which is
generally considered the start of the Great Depression." Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1987 at 1, col.
6. It is generally understood today that the stock market crash in 1929 was not the cause of
the following depression. In fact, it was the following government fiscal and monetary policy
which caused the depression. Id. at col. 5. The much greater percentage drop in the stock
market in 1987, in spite of the pervasive federal securities laws and mandatory disclosures, also
casts substantial doubt upon the government's notion that the cause of the 1929 crash was the
failure of securities laws and of company disclosures. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying
text.
89. H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 88, at 2. See Douglas & Bates, supra note 46, at 171.
90. See Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
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Franklin Roosevelt's 1932 platform for office included a plan for federal
regulation of the securities industry and for securities disclosure. In a message
to Congress, he stated that "[tihere is, however, an obligation upon us to
insist that every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce
shall be accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no essen-
tially important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the
buying public." 9' The lawyers who were assigned to draft such a statute
were determined to remain true to the concept voiced by President Roosevelt
in this message. 92 Using their familiarity with the English Companies Act
and state securities laws, the lawyers, over a weekend, prepared a "hurried
draft" which later became the "core" of the Securities Act of 1933. 91 The
Act was passed within the first 100 days of the Roosevelt administration,
less than two months after President Roosevelt's message to Congress.
94
The Securities Act of 1933 imposed antifraud and mandatory disclosure
requirements on issuers of securities in the primary markets. The putative
REv. 29, 30 (1959) (James M. Landis was Professor of Legislation at Harvard law school in
1933 when he was asked by Felix Frankfurter, then also a Harvard law school professor, to
help write the 1933 Act); infra note 107 and accompanying text. It is too early to tell what the
scapegoat will be for the 1987 stock market crash. "In addition to investigating the causes and
effects of volatility, [the SEC Chairman] Mr. Ruder told Congress that the SEC plans to look
into five areas: the role of index-related trading; market-making capacity; operational capacity
of the securities markets; financial integrity of brokers-dealers; and the effects of the interna-
tionalization of the markets." Wall St. J., Nov. 16, 1987 at 6, col. 1. Cf. Wall St. J., Nov.
17, 1987 at 33, col. 4 ("It's not necessary to search for a cause [of the crash] hidden in the
mechanics of trading, in the capital requirements of specialists and brokers, in the existence of
futures-index markets, in program trading or in increased electronic assistance in trading ....
These are scapegoats, not fundamental causes." This article suggests that booms, busts and
volatility are inevitable and are an inherent part of the function of valuing securities over time
by the market.).
91. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). The full quote is as follows:
I recommend to the Congress legislation for federal supervision of traffic in
investment securities in interstate commerce.
In spite of many State statutes the public in the past has sustained severe losses
through practices neither ethical nor honest on the part of many persons and
corporations selling securities.
Of course, the federal government cannot and should not take any action which
might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are
sound in the sense that their value will be maintained or that the properties which
they represent will earn profit. There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist
that every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be
accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially important
element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.
Id.
92. Landis, supra note 90, at 34.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 49. In response to a Presidential message urging that there be added to the ancient
rule of caveat emptor the further doctrine of "let the seller also beware," Congress passed the
Securities Act of 1933. Designed to protect investors, the Act requires issuers, underwriters,
and dealers to make full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and
foreign commerce and to prevent fraud in their sales. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953).
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goals of the Act were "to provide investors with full disclosure of material
information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect
investors against fraud and, through the imposition of specified civil liabil-
ities, to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing." 95 The Act
was based on the premise that the small investors, unable to fend for
themselves, could best be protected by requiring "full and fair disclosure,"
upon which they could make intelligent investment decisions. 96 "Disclosure
was intended ... to serve two primary and correlative functions. It was
believed that disclosure (1) would provide investors with a sound basis for
making informed and rational investment decisions; and (2) would deter
those in control of public business enterprises from fraudulent and unethical
conduct." ' 97 The disclosure requirements were not only proposed for the
purpose of information, but also were intended to serve with the antifraud
provisions to protect investors from forms of fraud which relied on secrecy
and misinformation. 9s Although it has been suggested that the real purpose
of the 1933 Act was to restore public confidence in the securities markets
and to lift the country out of a depression, 99 the SEC accepted the stated
95. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933).
96. Preamble to the Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
97. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 347-49 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT]. See
also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) ("The design of the statute is to
protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed
investment decisions.").
98. Douglas & Bates, supra note 46, at 172. See also Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick
Corp., 257 F. Supp. 875, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("The legislative history of the 1933 Act reveals
that the underlying purpose of the Act was 'to protect the public with the least possible
interference to honest business."' S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933)); Reader v.
Hirsh & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ("The Securities Act of 1933 was designed
to protect investors").
99. Morton & Booker, The Paradoxical Nature of Federal Securities Regulations, 44 DEN.
U.L. REV. 479, 480-82 (1967).
The problem of the Depression in 1933 was not that investors were being defrauded
by misleading information and that a federal law to protect them was necessary.
The problem of the Depression was that people with money had lost confidence in
the securities markets because of the stock market crash of 1929. It was to regain
this confidence that the Securities Acts were created .... Their goal was to restore
investor confidence in the securities markets because the source of funds for
financing American business had dried up to a mere trickle. It was investor
confidence they were after, not protection of helpless and defenseless people.
Id.
An introduction summarizes the article:
Professor Morton and Professor Booker point out several inconsistencies which
exist between the intended purposes of the Federal Securities Acts and their actual
effect. Originally the Acts were meant to stimulate financing of American business
by restoring investor confidence lost during the Great Depression of the 1930s. The
Acts require the issuer to disclose information concerning his reliability and his
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
goal of protecting the individual investor through mandatory disclosure. This
stated goal remains the major objective of the SEC today.' °
The 1934 Act extended many of the disclosure requirements of the 1933
Act to previously issued securities listed on stock exchanges.' 0' "The 1934
Act was intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of
stock prices through regulation of transactions upon securities and in over-
the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting requirements on com-
panies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges."' 0 2 The regis-
tration and periodic reporting requirements are intended to provide useful
information to the individual investor and to protect against stock market
manipulations which depend on secrecy and misinformation. 3 Therefore,
the putative and adopted purpose of the mandatory disclosure requirements
of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts is disclosure for investment purposes and
investor protection. Unlike the more hurried 1933 Act, however, the 1934
business purpose as a means of protecting the small investor. Ironically, this attempt
to increase the flow of capital has actually hindered investment because trading in
securities is viewed by the SEC as speculation which must be curbed rather than
recognized as the primary purpose of the Act. The authors argue that buying and
selling securities should be recognized for what it is-speculation-and encouraged
because it channels risk capital into business development. They show that the data
which the Acts require to be disclosed obscures more than it informs ....
Id. at 479. See also Kripke, supra note 6, at 260 (discussing Morton & Booker).
The authors' thesis is that the real purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 was to
restore public confidence in the securities markets to lift the country out of de-
pression. Morton and Booker believe that the 'peccadillos' or frauds in the securities
markets in the period before the Great Crash of 1929 were no worse than those of
prior periods; however, more persons and classes of society were hurt by the Great
Crash than in prior periods because more people had been speculating. The authors
believe that Congress' real purpose in passing the Securities Act was getting the
markets working to finance business, but the Act was sold to the public under the
more attractive guise of protecting the individual investor by preventing fraud.
Eventually, the SEC began to believe its own publicity and started to concentrate
on the antifraud function, even at the expense of the flow of capital. The SEC
undoubtedly came to believe its own rhetoric.
Id.
100. See ADVIsORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 97, at 347-48.
Disclosure was intended by the framers of the Securities and Exchange Act to serve
two primary, and correlative functions. It was believed that disclosure (1) would
provide investors with a sound basis for making informed and rational investment
decisions; and (2) would deter those in control of public business enterprises from
fraudulent and unethical conduct.
Although it is at least arguable that the statutory disclosure system created by
the 1933 and 1934 Acts was perceived by Congress and commentators as being
particularly suited to the interests of sophisticated investors and securities profes-
sionals, for many years the disclosure policy of the (SEC) was based on the belief
that the relevant constituency was the unsophisticated investor.
101. See McCauley, infra note 107 and accompanying text.
102. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
103. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934); see also Anderson, supra note 87,
at 328.
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Act states the need for the legislation due to "national emergencies, which
• . .are precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by manipulation and sudden
and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices and by excessive speculation
on such exchanges and markets . . . . "14 Like the earlier Act, the 1934 Act
may also have been enacted to help lift the country out of a depression. 15
Neither Act was repealed after the recovery, and both acts continued to be
enforced and expanded, even into the prospering markets of the 1940s and
1950s. Except for some changes which began in the 1960s (to be discussed
below),' °6 the basic structure of both Acts, as originally enacted, remains
intact.
III. BACKGROUND OF MovEMErs FOR REFORM
In the early 1960s, changes began in the scheme of federal securities
regulation. In a 1960 report to President-Elect Kennedy, one of the original
drafters of the Securities Act of 1933 identified significant problems in the
administration of securities regulation and recommended simplification and
reform.' 0 7 In 1961, Congress directed the SEC to conduct a study which
culminated in the 1963 Report of Special Study of the Securities Market. 0
104. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (1982 & Supp. III 1985);
see also United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) ("The primary purpose
of the Acts was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market ... and
the need for regulation to prevent fraud and to protect the interests of investors."); SEC v.
Southwest Coal & Energy Co., 624 F.2d 1312, 1318 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The federal securities
laws were enacted primarily to serve two distinct goals: 1) to promote or require sufficient
disclosure of information to allow those in securities markets to make intelligent investment
decisions, and 2) to control fraud and manipulation in the trading of securities."); SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Ent., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The 1933 and 1934 Acts are
remedial legislation, among the central purposes of which is full and fair disclosure relative to
the issuance of securities."); SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. of S.C., 463 F.2d 137, 154-55
(5th Cir. 1972) ("These statutes constitute a comprehensive plan to protect investors by requiring
the filing of a registration statement containing material facts bearing upon the investment
merit of securities which are publicly offered or sold through the use of the mails or through
instrumentalities of interstate commerce."); Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596,
602 (7th Cir. 1965) ("[T]he policy of the federal securities laws is to protect investors, including
the uninformed, the ignorant, and the gullible."); SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 334
F. Supp. 444, 455 (N.D. Tex. 1971) ("Congress passed the securities laws in order to establish
the means and standard through which the public can rely on fair, honest and prudent conduct
in the maintenance of a securities market free from fraudulent practices.").
105. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 107-35 and accompanying text.
107. J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960); see
McCauley, The Securities Laws-After 40 Years: A Need for Rethinking, 48 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1092 (1973).
108. SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION. H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). This report is still
the most comprehensive study of the securities markets ever made. See R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (5th ed. 1982); Seligman, The Historical Need for a Man-
datory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 41 (1983).
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This study resulted in the 1964 amendments' °9 to the securities laws, the first
step toward a conceptual merging of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.110 The 1964
amendments extended the registration requirements of the 1934 Act beyond
securities traded on national exchanges to include over-the-counter securities,
which, unless exempt, had always been subject to the static registration
requirements of the 1933 Act.
In a seminal article in 1966, Milton Cohen noted the duplicative nature
of the disclosure systems under the 1933 and 1934 Acts and espoused the
concept of a coordinated disclosure law which would give rise to a constant
disclosure system through continuous registration."' In 1967, the SEC re-
109. See supra note 62.
110. McCauley, supra note 107, at 1095.
111. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1340 (1966). THE AUTHOR'S
CONCLUSIONS SET THE STANDARD FOR SECURITIES REGULATION REFORM FOR THE NEXT 15 YEARS:
A. General-In a coordinated disclosure law and its administration primary em-
phasis should shift from the 1933 Act's sporadic ad hoc disclosures to the 1934
Act's continuous disclosure system. It follows that the "1933 Act" concepts should
have altogether different application to issuers that are fully subject to the contin-
uous disclosure system ("continuous registrants") and to the issuers that are not.
B. The Continuous Disclosure System-Within the limits of practicality, the con-
tinuous disclosure system of the 1934 Act should be solidified and strengthened in
terms of quality, currency, and accessibility of filed data, to the end that there may
be available in the public file at all times, in readily identifiable and accessible
form, substantially the equivalent of a current prospectus for every continuous
registrant.
C. Continuous Registrant-(l) a continuous registrant's material transactions in
its own securities, purchases as well as sales, should be considered in the first
instance as items for disclosure in its continuous file, for the benefit of investors
generally, and any special procedures for the benefit of offerees should be considered
ancillary.
(2) Provisions of the 1933 Act and rules that are designed to assure maximum reach
and scope of the special disclosure requirements for public offerings should be
greatly relaxed in respect of offerings (whether by the issuer or by other persons)
of securities of continuous registrants ....
(3) In connection with a public offering of securities of a continuous registrant, the
required filing in the continuous disclosure file should not call for any information
that merely duplicates (as distinguished from correcting, supplementing or updating),
what already appears in the public file.
(4) In connection with such offerings, the general presumption should be against
requiring the use of any prospectus, or the inclusion in a prospectus of any particular
information, that is not of materially greater interest or utility to offerees than to
other investors in the registrant's securities. In practice, this should mean that the
occasions when a prospectus will be required for securities of continuous registrants
will be substantially fewer than at present, and the contents of required prospectuses
will be considerably reduced.
D. Issuers other than Continuous Registrants-(l) A "first" public offering-any
offering of securities of which the issuer is not already a continuous registrant (but
will ordinarily become such as a result of the offering)-should, as in the past, be
the occasion for comprehensive "1933 Act" disclosures, not only for the benefit
of immediate offerees through a prospectus but as the foundation of future contin-
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sponded by adopting Form S-7 for certain registrants. 112 Form S-7, a 1933
Act registration statement, was shorter than the standard Form S-1 and
relied upon information available from the 1934 Act filings. The SEC
Commissioner, Francis M. Wheat, also appointed an internal study group,
with Milton Cohen as chairman, to further evaluate the disclosure system
under the Acts. The resulting Wheat Report made extensive recommendations
for integration of the two disclosure systems."' In 1970, the SEC made
another minor change and adopted Form S-16, which permitted certain
registrants under the 1933 Act to incorporate by reference information which
was filed under the 1934 Act. 114
Earlier, in 1964, economist George Stigler made a more fundamental
challenge to the 1933 Act's mandatory disclosure system."' Based on eco-
nomic and statistical studies, he suggested that the mandatory disclosures of
the 1933 Act did little, if anything to protect investors from fraud and had
no significant effect on the quality of securities publicly offered." 6 There-
uous disclosures. (2) For companies that are not already continuous registrants, the
definition of "1933 Act" disclosure obligations should be in simpler but firmer
terms than at present, so as to assure that a basic registration document will have
been filed and a full prospectus will be used whenever a company first comes to
have more than a specified number of security holders, through whatever channels
(3) In the case of "first" offerings, to the extent practicable, it should be required
that the substantial equivalent of a present "final" prospectus be in the hands of
offerees in time to be available for investment decision, rather than as late as the
time of confirmation.
Id. at 1406-08. This article by Milton Cohen often has been cited in court cases. See, e.g., Feit
v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 257 F. Supp. 875, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
112. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4886 (Nov. 26, 1967).
113. SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER
THE '33 AND '34 SECURITIES ACTS (1969) [hereinafter The Wheat Report]. For a summary of
The Wheat Report proposals see Posner, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation, 25
Bus. LAW. 1643 (1970); Comment, Securities Regulation-The Wheat Report Proposals, 35
Mo. L. REv. 188 (1970).
The coordination that the Wheat Report has attempted to achieve is particularly
significant since lack of coordination of disclosure between the '33 and '34 Acts
has been a major weakness of securities law since passage of the '34 Act. As a
result of the 1964 amendments to the '34 Act, companies with over one [presently
five] million dollars in assets and 500 shareholders are subject to extensive reporting
and proxy requirements of the '34 Act. Yet, when these companies make a public
offering of a security, the '33 Act requires disclosure of basically the same infor-
mation that has been previously disclosed under the '34 Act. This duplication is
costly in both time and money without being of any significant benefit to the
investing public. If the desired coordination is achieved the Wheat Report should
be considered a significant factor in the development of securities regulation.
Id. at 213.
114. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5117 (Dec. 23, 1970).
115. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 19 Bus. LAW. 721 (1964).
116. Id.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
after, Henry Manne1 7 and George Benston" s expanded this theme through
a series of articles and books using economic and statistical data. They
contended that the mandatory disclosures of the 1933 and 1934 Acts were
not useful to investors and that a mandatory disclosure system served neither
to protect nor to inform investors. As the basis for these assertions, Benston
argued that there was little evidence of any increase in fraud in the period
preceding 1933. Secondly, Benston argued that voluntary corporate disclo-
sures before the 1933 and 1934 Acts provided investors with sufficient
investment information. Lastly, he argued that mandatory disclosures were
not material to investors, or that they were too untimely to be of any value,
because most of the data was already disclosed through voluntary corporate
disclosure and other means." 9 Benston's arguments were supported by his
prolific empirical and statistical studies. His series of articles presented
evidence and arguments of the following: (1) that corporate financial state-
ments were not less misleading since the passage of the 1934 Act; (2) that
the 1934 Act disclosure requirement did not enable investors to predict future
security price movements more accurately or provide investors with infor-
mation to increase the safety of their investments; and (3) that investor
confidence in the securities markets failed to increase.2 0
In 1970, Professor Homer Kripke began to advocate a "fresh rethinking"
of mandated disclosure using these empirical studies and modern economic
theory.' 2' Professor Kripke proposed that mandated disclosures cannot enable
a lay investor to achieve an informed investment decision.' l He continued
to articulate his proposals in several articles. 2 3 During this period, 24 the
117. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); H. MANNE & E. SOLOMON,
WALL STREET IN TRANSITION (1974); H. MANNE, ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF
CORPORATE SECURITIES (H. Manne ed. 1969).
118. Benston's major articles and book in chronological order were: Benston, The Value of
the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, 44 ACCT. REV. 515 (1969); Benston, The
Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in ECONOMIC
POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23 (H. Manne ed. 1969); Benston,
Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, AM. EcON. REv., March 1973, at 132; G. BENSTON, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
IN THE UK AND USA (1976); Benston, Required Periodic Disclosure Under the Securities Acts
and the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1471 (1979); and Benston,
The Costs and Benefits of Government-Required Disclosure: SEC and FTC Requirements: An
Appraisal, in CORPORATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS: GOVERNANCE AND REFORM (DeMott ed. 1980).
119. See Seligman, supra note 108, at 12-18.
120. Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation
of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1058 (1977).
121. Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants-Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1151 (1970).
122. Id. at 1153.
123. Kripke, A Search for a Meaningful Securities Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAW. 293
(1975); Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAW. 631 (1973); Kripke, The
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federal securities laws were also criticized in several other articles.
In 1976, the SEC responded by appointing an Advisory Committee (which
included Professor Kripke) to reevaluate the securities disclosure system. In
1977, the Advisory Committee issued a report 2 which recommended up-
grading the quality of the 1934 Act reports and complete integration of the
two disclosure systems. These recommendations went beyond the proposals
of the Wheat Report. The Advisory Committee's report also repudiated the
criticisms of mandatory disclosure. The committee's transmittal letter to the
SEC concluded that "the disclosure system established by Congress in the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as imple-
mented and developed by the Securities and Exchange Commission since its
creation in 1934, is sound and does not need radical reform or renovation."'' 26
Indeed, the introduction to the report stated that "[i]t appears beyond a
reasonable doubt at the present time that the dismantling of the disclosure
system . . . might very well result in a serious and lasting impairment of
public confidence in the fairness of the securities markets .. ".. ,,27 This
"pretzel logic," 1 2 as Professor Kripke called it, led to his dissent from the
report. Although Professor Kripke agreed with certain recommendations, he
dissented because the Committee "avoided the difficult issues and expended
its time ... by engaging in overlapping the kind of patchwork improvement
Objective of Financial Accounting Should Be To Provide Information for the Serious Investor,
42 C.P.A. J. 389 (1972).
124. See Anderson, supra note 87; McCauley, supra note 106; Mann, Prospectuses: Unread-
able or Just Unread?-A Proposal to Reexamine Policies Against Permitting Projections, 40
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 222 (1971); Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings,
121 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1972); Schneider, An Administrative Program for Reforming the
Federal Securities Laws, 115 U. PA L. REV. 1023 (1967); Panel Discussion, New Approaches
to Disclosure in Registered Securities Offerings-A Panel Discussion, 28 Bus. LAW. 505 (1973);
Proceedings, Conference on the Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793
(1967).
125. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 97, at 3-7.
A continuous, coordinated and integrated disclosure system for industrial issuers
required to file information under the 1933 and 1934 Acts will curtail registration
costs and administrative obstacles incurred by industrial issuers in raising capital,
facilitate timely access to the capital markets, and simplify the exchange offer and
business combination processes. Further integration is warranted at this time ....
One caveat accompanies the recommendations for further integration .... Further
integration by short form registration procedures which take into account infor-
mation available in the market place and permit incorporation by reference of 1934
Act reports must be conditioned on the improved quality and dissemination of
disclosures in periodic reports.
Id.
126. Kripke, Where Are We On Securities Disclosures After the Advisory Committee Report?,
6 SEC. REc. L.J. 99, 101 (1978).
127. Id. at xxvi-xxvii.
128. Kripke, supra note 126, at 101.
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of forms that the (SEC) had been doing for forty years"1 29 rather than
taking a fresh look at mandatory disclosure.
In spite of the Advisory Committee's conclusions, the criticism of man-
datory disclosure and securities regulation continued. 130 The SEC and Con-
gress responded to the Advisory Committee Report, and continued criticism
by adopting Regulation S-K in 1977. This regulation introduced a standard
set of instructions for filing forms under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. In 1978,
the SEC increased the availability of Form S-16 to a greater number of
registrants.'"' Between 1978 and 1980, Congress adopted three Acts, which
increased the maximum exemption of a securities issue, under section 3(b)
of the 1933 Act, from $500,000 to $5,000,000.132 In 1980, major changes
were adopted for Form 10-K, Rule 14a-3, Regulation S-K, and Regulation
S-X, which prescribed uniform financial disclosure requirements for most
documents filed under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 3 The Advisory Committee's
report also led to the adoption of the integrated disclosure system which
was proposed in 1980134 and adopted by the SEC in 1982.'11
IV. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE
Milton Cohen's 1966 article also led to a conference of the American Bar
Association (ABA) which agreed to propose a codification of the federal
securities laws. 136 In 1968, the American Law Institute (ALI) began drafting
a Federal Securities Code. Over the next ten years, a committee produced
seven tentative drafts and a final draft which the ALI approved in 1978.1'"
In 1979, the ABA recommended enactment of the Code by Congress.' In
1980, the SEC announced its support of the Code with certain recommended
changes. 39 By this time, however, a new administration and a new Congress,
129. Id.
130. H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE
(1979); ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure,
36 Bus. LAW. 119 (1980); Kripke, supra note 123; Weiss, Disclosure and Corporate Account-
ability, 34 Bus. LAW. 575 (1979); Note, The Efficient Capital Market, supra note 120.
131. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5923 (Apr. 10, 1978).
132. In order, they were: Securities Investor Protection Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-283, § 18, 92 Stat. 249, 275 (1978); Act of Oct. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-425, § 2, 92
Stat. 962 (1978); and Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, §
301, 94 Stat. 2275, 2291 (1980). Pursuant to this increased authority, the SEC issued Regulation
D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-06 (1986). See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
133. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6231 (Sept. 2, 1980).
134. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6235 (Sept. 2, 1980).
135. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6383 (Mar. 3, 1982). See infra notes 167-99 and
accompanying text.
136. Proceedings, Conference on Codification of Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793
(1967). For a history of legislative reform movements for codification dating back to 1940, see
Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAW. 27 (1969).
137. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 43-54 (1982).
138. Id.
139. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6242 (Sept. 18, 1980).
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unfamiliar with the Code, were in place. 140 The Code also had other serious
problems.141 Thus, having never been introduced to Congress, there is little
hope that the Code will ever be. enacted. 142 The Code, however, encourages
the adoption of the SEC's integrated disclosure system, 143 and, more impor-
tantly, its achievements and failures are relevant to an understanding of the
present status of federal securities laws.
The Code had three principle goals: "(1) simplification of an inevitably
complex body of law in the light of almost a half-century of administration
and litigation; (2) elimination . . .of duplicate regulation; and (3) reexami-
nation of the entire scheme of investor protection with a view towards
increasing its efficiency.. . ." 44The Code attempted to integrate all of the
federal securities laws 4 into one comprehensive Code. The Code in fact
retains most of the basic regulations contained in several different statutes,
with some changes. One technical change was the organization of the statutes
into one code with cross-references and common definitions.' 46 Some fun-
damental changes were achieved by reducing inconsistencies that resulted
from the piecemeal adoption of seven statutes and a patchwork of amend-
ments and regulations. The designated reporter for the Code, Professor
Louis Loss, claimed that the Code thereby reduced the complexity of the
federal securities laws.147 The Code also attempted to reduce the complexity
of the regulatory system by substituting a single system of continuous
disclosure of company registration for the separate static and continuous
disclosure schemes of the two existing Acts. Moreover, the Code attempted
to eliminate or simplify many of the "obtuse" and "overly sophistic" rules
of the SEC.1 41
The Code also codified much of the law on extraterritorial application of
the SEC legislation within the limits of international law. 49 On the other
hand, it proposed the preemption of many state securities laws to avoid
unnecessary duplication of regulation and to maximize the effectiveness of
both federal and state controls. 50 In addition, there was substantial, though
140. L. Loss, SUPPLEMENT TO FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 6 (1985).
141. See, e.g., Lowenfells, The Case Against the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 65 VA.
L. REV. 615, 660 (1979) ("The proposed Code does not solve many of the existing problems
and creates a host of new and more serious problems.").
142. Id. at 660-61.
143. See infra notes 167-99 and accompanying text.
144. ALI, 1 FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE at xix (1980) [hereinafter ALl CODE]. The goals of
the ALI CODE interestingly are similar to the purposes of the recent Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2303 (1986). See H.R. REP. No. 429, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 54-
62 (1986); S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-8 (1986). The three major goals of this Act
are fairness, simplification, and economic efficiency. Id.
145. ALI CODE, supra note 144, at xix.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at xix-xx. See Loss, supra note 136, at 28.
149. ALI CODE, supra note 144, at lvi.
150. Id.
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incomplete, codification and coordination of the civil liability and antifraud
rules. Professor Loss described the area of civil liability as "chaotic" as a
result of judicial implication of private rights of action.15 The Code made
express those liabilities presently implied at law. The Code, however, also
provided guidance for the implication of other liabilities. 52 For instance, the
Code would continue to allow an implied liability for a violation of a rule
of a self-regulatory organization, but would give authority to the SEC to
exempt such violations.' 53
The proposed Code addressed many of the criticisms discussed in the
preceding section. 54 The Code was approved by the ALI, the ABA, and the
SEC, yet it was never introduced in Congress.' Many reasons exist for the
Code's failure.
In many respects, the Code did not produce significant changes in the
federal securities law. The Code was largely a recodification of the existing
law. In the area of civil liability, the Code simply made express the liabilities
already implied at law. 56 Even in areas where it did propose changes, they
often appeared to be mere changes in form rather than substance.
Although proponents of the Code asserted that it made major changes
toward continuous disclosure, it retained many provisions which were similar
to the 1933 Act. For instance, although the Code eliminated the registration
statement requirement under the 1933 Act, it continued to require that the
disclosure system be supplemented by an "offering statement,"' 57 a "distri-
bution statement,"' 58 and "a prospectus delivery requirement more or less
as in present law."' 59 Due to the continuing requirement of offering and
distribution statements, the Code retained a number of exemptions which
closely paralleled those of the 1933 Act in type, but with some change in
form.16' However, the details of these exemptions, as well as the scope of
the Code, were not specified. 'Instead, the Code granted the SEC broad
rulemaking power to create regulations to fill in the gaps.' 6' Consequently,
the drafters of the Code missed an opportunity to propose genuine or
significant reforms.
In addition, the securities bar found a recodification inconsequential be-
cause of its years of accumulated expertise in securities laws. Support was
also lacking at a more fundamental level. In 1980, the new administration
151. Id. at xix.
152. Id. at xliii-iii.
153. Id. at iii.
154. See supra notes 107-35 and accompanying text.
155. L. Loss, supra note 140.
156. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
157. ALI CODE, supra note 144, at xxviii.
158. Id. at xixx.
159. Id. at xxxi.
160. See W. PAINTER, THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 11-37
(1979).
161. Lowenfells, supra note 141, at 615-40.
[Vol. 37:447
19881 SECURITIES REGULATION REFORM
had other legislative priorities and no national emergency of the type which
had spurred the initial legislation existed. Furthermore, the Code's proposal
to give broad rulemaking authority to the SEC not only presented a sub-
stantial departure from existing law, but also conflicted with the recent trend
toward deregulation. 162 Like the present statutory scheme, the Code does not
consider economic, financial, or business interests, nor does it address whether
the benefits of the regulation exceed the costs as a whole, or whether any
of the specific areas of law would succeed in a cost/benefit analysis. 163 The
Code relied on no economic, statistical, or empirical studies concerning the
value or necessity of mandatory disclosures or exemption categories. In fact,
the drafters did not even consult with experts in other disciplines, such as
economics or accounting. 16 This action placed the Code in direct conflict
with the critics of the present system which was castigated on the same
grounds. The Code was similarly criticized because it failed to adopt a fresh
rethinking of the laws on a fundamental level. 165 It is significant, however,
that the goals of the Code and its premises reflect many of the same objectives
and reforms sought by the critics of present securities laws.
Shortly after the Code was completed, the SEC proposed and adopted its
integrated disclosure system which employed some of the Code's proposals. 66
Although the Code has had some influence, the adoption of the SEC's
integrated disclosure system helped seal its fate.
162. Id. at 656.
163. Id. at 657 (federal securities laws and the Code have been called "lawyer's law" because
they are developed by lawyers without sufficient consideration of economic, financial and
business realities). Contra Throop, The Proposed Federal Securities Code: A Response to its
Critics, 33 U. MIAM L. REv. 1597, 1600 (1979).
With respect to the need for 'empirical evidence,' on which Professor Benston urges
that any codification should have been based, certain observations should be made.
First, the ALI is not fundamentally a 'reform' organization. It was initially conceived
as doing for court decisions what the Code would do with respect to statutory and
decisional federal securities law. But its 'Restatements' have been intended to be
more than mere compilation and digests, and frequently reflect a thorough analysis
of conflicting precedents, with rational support for a particular and occasionally
new, approach to a difficult problem. Hence, it is not surprising that the Code,
although reflecting the 'lawyer's law' approach of ALI membership, is, as it should
be, more than a mere compilation and digest.
Id.
164. Kripke, supra note 48, at 1469.
165. Id.
166. See infra notes 167-99 and accompanying text. Portions of the ALI Code, particularly
Part XVI on fraud and Part XVII on civil liability, have been cited in several dozen cases as
if they were a restatement of the law. L. Loss, supra note 139, at 56. See, e.g., Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 n.9 (1980) (ALI Code § 262); TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976) (ALI Code § 256); Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec.
Co., 423 U.S. 232, 240 n.ll (1976) (ALI Code § 1413(d)); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730, 767 (1975) (citation to Conference on Codification of the Federal
Securities Laws, supra note 136 and reference to ALI Code in dissent); see also Crowell v.
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 373 F. Supp. 1303, 1310 (E.D. Penn. 1974) (recommending
prompt enactment of the Code).
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V. INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE AND PRESENT FUNCTIONING OF SECURITIES
REGULATION
The preceding sections provide the background for the SEC's adoption of
the integrated disclosure system. 167 On March 16, 1982, the SEC, in response
to the Wheat Report, the Advisory Committee Report, the ALI Federal
Securities Code, and various critics, adopted the integrated disclosure sys-
tem. 1 68 In the preceding 15 years, small steps were taken which ultimately
facilitated and permitted the integration. The SEC had experimented with
integrated disclosure on a small scale after both the Wheat Report and
Advisory Committee Report recommended much greater integration. Forms
S-7 and S-16 were issued. 69 The use of the forms, however, was limited to
a small portion of reporting companies. This created situations in which
information in filings under the 1934 Act was relied upon or incorporated
by reference in 1933 Act filings. Throughout the 1970s, the SEC expanded
the disclosures required under the periodic reporting rules of the 1934 Act
and reduced the inconsistencies in the disclosure provisions between the two
Acts.' 70 The integrated disclosure system helped to complete this process.
The integrated disclosure system coordinates and simplifies the disclosure
requirements under the 1933 and the 1934 Acts. The SEC has explained that
the goal in adopting the new system is "to revise or eliminate over-lapping
or unnecessary disclosure and dissemination requirements wherever possible,
thereby reducing burdens on registrants while at the same time ensuring that
security holders, investors and the marketplace have been provided with
meaningful, nonduplicative information upon which to base investment de-
cisions."' 7'1 Under the system, transaction-specific information continues to
be required whenever securities are issued under the 1933 Act. 72 However,
general registrant-oriented information may already be available under the
167. See supra notes 107-66 and accompanying text.
168. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6383 (Mar. 3, 1982).
169. See supra notes 103-20 and accompanying text.
170. PLI, REPRESENTING PUBLICALLY TRADED CORPORATIONS UNDER THE NEW INTEGRATED
DISCLOSURE SYSTEM 13 (Eppler & Gilroy eds. 1982).
171. SEC, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF SECURITIES ACT RELEASES Nos. 6331-38 (Aug. 6, 1981).
The integrated disclosure system harmonizes the two disclosure systems-which have
grown up independently and on a largely piece-meal basis for the more than forty
years since the statutes were enacted-into a single comprehensive disclosure system.
It will perform the roles envisioned by both statutes, but, at the same time will
eliminate or reduce the overlapping or duplicative corporate reporting, which was
the product of two distinct systems, and will streamline corporate reporting generally
.... The integrated disclosure system simplifies corporate reporting in three ways:
(1) disclosure requirements are made uniform under the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act; (2) Exchange Act periodic reporting is used to satisfy much of the
disclosure necessary in Securities Act registration statements; and (3) the use of
informal shareholder communications is encouraged but not required, to satisfy
formal statutory requirements under both Acts.
Id.
172. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6383 (Mar. 3, 1982).
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1934 Act reporting requirements and, therefore, may be incorporated by
reference in some circumstances. 173
The greatest benefit of the integrated disclosure rules is available only to
the largest companies which, under SEC standards, have a sufficient market
following so as to assure that the information in 1934 Act filings has been
disseminated through the marketplace. 174 If qualified, these companies may
use Form S-3 to register security issues under the Securities Act. This form
incorporates, by reference, information included in the registrant's annual
report on Form 10-K under the 1934 Act,7 5 unless there has been a material
change. Only the transaction-specific information need be reported to the
investor in the prospectus. 17 6
Where a registrant is not large enough to use Form S-3, it may be able
to use Form 5-2,177 assuming the registrant has been a reporting company
under the 1934 Act for at least three years. Although this form incorporates,
by reference, information filed by the registrant on Form 10-K, an annual
report must be delivered with the prospectus or the prospectus must include
all comparable disclosures. Form S-l, the standard long form registration
statement which does not rely on 1934 Act disclosures, is used by all other
companies and may be used in lieu of Form S-2 or Form 5-3.178 Similar
forms with comparable requirements were also adopted for foreign issuers
and investment companies. 79
In order to coordinate these disclosures, Regulations S-K and S-X were
enacted as the standard rules for disclosure under both Acts.8 0 Integration
was also achieved in the provisions under the 1933 Act in Regulation C and
under the 1934 Act in Regulation 12B. This integration, however, was not
complete due to the continuing differences between the Acts.' 8'
The integrated disclosure changes in Regulation C included a very impor-
tant experimental rule. Rule 415 permits "shelf" registration of securities
which the registrant reasonably expects to offer and sell within two years.8 2
Issuers are able to register securities on the shelf and bring the securities
into the market with no further registration requirements or delays during
this two year period. The rule was not initially adopted as a permanent rule
due to the protests of underwriters and investment bankers. Representatives
of the securities industry and former SEC Commissioner Thomas argued
that the rule was a threat to the capital markets and to the protection of
173. Id.
174. SEC, SPECIAL REPORT: 1982 INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE ADOPTIONS (Mar. 11, 1982).
175. See supra note 168.






182. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1987).
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investors," 3 as underwriters would be unable to fulfill their due diligence
duties and investors would not have time to study the prospectus. Regional
underwriters would then face extinction and investors could retreat from the
capital markets, never to return.1 4
The SEC held many hearings, gathered empirical data to evaluate the
effect of the Rule, and even extended the trial period of the Rule due to the
controversy." 5 In 1983, the SEC decided that the experiment was a success
and adopted Rule 415 on a permanent basis, with some modifications.8 6
During the experimental period, the Rule did not appear to have a detrimental
effect on the capital markets or investor protection. In fact, investors, issuers
and the capital markets have benefitted from the rule.8 7 Former Commis-
sioner Thomas and the securities industry, however, may have noticed a less
touted consequence of the rule-that of fewer revenues for underwriters
from equity underwritings. 8 8 Professor Banoff, in her analysis of the effect
of the Rule, concluded that:
[S]helf registration permits issuers to sell more accurately priced securities
at a lower cost, increases allocational efficiency, reduces inappropriate
wealth transfers from investors to investment bankers or from relatively
poor investors to relatively wealthy ones, and does not pose any particular
threat to the disclosure system or to due diligence.-s9
Professor Banoff also adds that "the only valid criticism of the [SEC's]
action is that it placed too many limitations on the rule; as long as an
efficient market exists for the issuer's securities, the [SEC] should allow that
issuer to use shelf registration."',
Since the adoption of the integrated disclosure system, the SEC has
attempted further simplification, deregulation and integration in other areas,
such as proxies' 9' and business combinations. 92 Although not strictly part
of the integrated disclosure system, the SEC also adopted Regulation D. 193
Under statutory authority of the 1933 Act, the SEC promulgated these rules
which allowed securities of up to $5,000,000 per year to be issued pursuant
to an exemption under Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act. 94
183. Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets and Shelf Registration: An Analysis of
Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REv. 135, 165-84 (1984).
184. Id.
185. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6423 (Sept. 2, 1982).
186. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6499 (Nov. 17, 1983).
187. See infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
188. Banoff, supra note 183, at 169-70.
189. Id. at 184.
190. Id.
191. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6676 (Nov. 10, 1986).
192. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6578 (Apr. 23, 1985).
193. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6389 (Mar. 8, 1982); 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-.06 (1986).
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 37:447
SECURITIES REGULATION REFORM
The integrated disclosure system is based on two assumptions which have
been proposed by various critics of or consultants to the SEC. First, the
disclosures which are necessary for trading in a primary issue of securities
are generally the same as those for trading in existing securities on the
secondary markets. 19 Second, the SEC partially adopted the theory that an
efficient market of professional analysts, institutional investors, financial
advisors and the financial press will widely and quickly disseminate the
information that is available in periodic reports filed under the 1934 Act. 96
Since this information is already widely disseminated in the marketplace and
reflected in the price of the securities, its inclusion in the prospectus is
superfluous. Consequently, the SEC has implicitly recognized that the indi-
vidual investor does not use the information provided through mandatory
disclosures, rather, the investor relies upon professional advice and market
forces. 1
97
In fact, the SEC only partially accepted the theory of an efficient market.
It assumed that 1934 Act disclosures would be widely disseminated only for
the largest publicly held securities, with a sufficient market following by
professionals. 198 In addition, the SEC continues to superstitiously require
formalistic incorporation of information, by reference, that need not be
repeated verbatim. 99
VI. MODERN ECONOMIC THEORY
Though the adoption of the integrated disclosure system represents a partial
acceptance of modern economic theory by the SEC, 200 original federal se-
curities legislation did not embrace modern economic theory. 20' Much of the
economic theory on which most securities law criticism is based developed
after the original federal securities laws. 20 2 One of these developments was
the recognition that security price movements were essentially "random. ' 20 3
The theory which developed to explain the "random walk" of security prices
was the "Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis. ' '2° The random price move-
ments of securities were consistent with prices that fully reflected all available
information because of efficient information processing by the capital mar-
kets. These new theories, which developed amid great controversy in the
1950s and 1960s, were contrary to the traditional assumptions about the
195. Banoff, supra note 179, at 138.
196. Id.
197. See Pickholz & Horahan, The SEC's Version of the Efficient Market Theory and Its
Impact on Securities Law Liabilities, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 943-44 (1982).
198. Banoff, supra note 183, at 138.
199. See supra note 197, at 949.
200. SEC Securities Act Releases Nos. 6235 (Sept. 2, 1980) & 6331 (Aug. 6, 1981).
201. See supra notes 88-106 and accompanying text.
202. Note, supra note 120, at 1034.
203. Id. at 1035.
204. Id.
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workings of the securities markets. 20 5 Empirical research has since confirmed
the assertions of these theories, and opponents of the theories largely lack
support. 206 Today, the theories enjoy overwhelming support in the economic,
financial, and legal communities. 20 7
The premise of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis is that the secu-
rities markets are efficient. New information about a security is rapidly
absorbed by the market and almost immediately is reflected in the price of
the security.20 s Because the information is quickly translated into price, the
price of a security itself gives an investor a significant amount of informa-
tion .20 9 If prices reflect all available information, subsequent mandatory
disclosures would not support any profitable trading advantages in the
securities. In an efficient market, therefore, investors who use any available
information cannot systematically profit from identifying and trading in
undervalued or overvalued securities. Assuming the market is efficient and
prices reflect all available information, the only rational program is to trade
as if the market is fair and the market prices are the best indication of the
securities' values. 210
The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis has been tested empirically under
three categories: the "weak;" the "semi-strong;" and the "strong. '21 The
weak form has been successfully tested to show that past price information
is not useful in predicting future price movements of securities, consistent
with the "random walk" of price movements. 2 2 The "semi-strong" hypoth-
esis has also been successfully tested to show that the market reacts quickly
and in an unbiased fashion to all publicly available information and that it
anticipates and processes this information from all available sources before
it is publicly announced.213
'Semi[-]strong' tests of market efficiency show that stock prices adjusted
quickly to public announcements concerning the company: the 'collective
action of a sufficient number of market participants buying or selling the
stock causes a very rapid, if not virtually instantaneous, adjustment in
price.' The price of the stock appears to reflect all publicly available
information, but not all privately held information .... 214
205. Id. at 1034.
206. Id. at 1031, 1041.
207. Banoff, supra note 183, at 179.
208. Note, supra note 120, at 1035-41.
209. Id.; see also In re LTV Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980) ("The market
is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given all the information
available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market price.").
210. Pickholz & Horahan, supra note 197, at 943.
211. Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70
VA. L. REV. 717, 719 n.10 (1984). See Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory
and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
212. Note, supra note 120, at 1041.
213. Id. at 1044.
214. In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Note, Disclosure of Future-Oriented Information under the Securities Laws, 88 YALE
L.J. 338, 344 n.32 (1978) (insiders consistently outperform the market).
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The last clause of the above quoted material, stating that the prices of
stocks do not reflect all privately held information, refers to evidence as-
sociated with the strong form. Empirical tests on the strong form indicate
that certain insiders may profitably trade on non-public information, sug-
gesting a source of inefficiency in the capital markets and that the price of
the security does not immediately and without bias reflect all available
information. 215
In addition to the failure of the strong form, other anomalies have
appeared. 2 6 This indicates that there is a need for technical adjustment or
that the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis is limited in its applicability to
certain narrowly defined areas. 27 It does not delimit the otherwise general
usefulness of the theory. "'[There is no other proposition in economics
which has more empirical evidence supporting it than the efficient market
hypothesis.' Despite certain anomalies, numerous studies demonstrate that
the capital market responds efficiently to an extraordinary variety of infor-
mation. ' ' 21 8 Realistically, no other comparable model or theory exists at the
present time to support an understanding of the securities markets. Conse-
quently, the only valid options are to accept or to reject the Efficient Capital
Market Hypothesis. This, however, is not an all or nothing proposition. The
hypothesis can be accepted for all purposes where empirically it has tested
successfully, which warrants its application except in very limited circum-
stances. 21 9 In weighing these options, almost all who have considered it have
accepted the theory's usefulness in a wide variety of contexts.
215. Note, supra note 120, at 1045.
216. Coffee, supra note 211, at 719 n.10.
217. Id.
218. Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 551
(1984) (quoting Professor Jensen in Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market
Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95 (1978)) (footnote omitted).
219. The Supreme Court has recently approved the assumptions of the Efficient Capital
Market Hypothesis:
Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress' premise that the market
price of shares traded on well developed markets reflects all publicly available
information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations. It has been noted that
"it is hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on
market integrity. Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?
Schlanger v. Four-Phase Systems Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Indeed, nearly every court that has considered the proposition has concluded that
where materially misleading statements have been disseminated into an impersonal,
well-developed market for securities, the reliance of individual plaintiffs on the
integrity of the market price may be presumed (footnote omitted). Commentators
generally have applauded the adoption of one variation or another of the fraud-
on-the-market theory. An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the
market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly
available information is reflectedin market price, an investor's reliance on any public
material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule
lOb-5 action.
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,645 (Mar. 9, 1988).
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Of all recent developments in financial economics, the efficient capital
market hypothesis ("ECMH") has achieved the widest acceptance by the
legal culture. It now commonly informs the academic literature on a variety
of topics; it is addressed by major law school casebooks and textbooks
on business law; it structures debate over the future of securities regulation
both within and without the (SEC); it has served as the intellectual premise
for a major revision of the disclosure system administered by the (SEC);
and it has even begun to influence judicial decisions and the actual practice
of law.220
Several courts have accepted the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis as
a basis for adopting a new theory of liability in securities law. "[A] plaintiff
need not show individual reliance ...when a 'fraud on the market' claim
is raised. ' 2 1 "Under this theory, a plaintiff . . . need ... allege ... only
that the plaintiff relied upon the integrity of the market price of the security
which was distorted by the impact of the particular mistatements [sic]." ' 222
"Underlying such an approach is the 'efficient market theory,' which, briefly
stated, is that in a free and actively traded market, absent compelling reasons
to believe otherwise, the market price is held to take account of asset value
as well as the other economic, political, and financial factors that determine
'value.' ' ' 223 "Recent economic studies tend to buttress empirically the central
assumption of the fraud on the market theory-that the market price reflects
all representations concerning the stock. '224
As stated above by the court, "absent compelling reasons to believe
otherwise, ' 225 the most rational course of behavior based on all the evidence
is to accept the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, except in very limited
circumstances. 226 The theory should not be rejected because certain insiders
are able to trade profitably on inside information or because public misre-
.220. Id. at 549-50 (footnote omitted).
221. In re LTV, 88 F.R.D. at 142 (N.D. Tex.1980).
222. Id.
223. Seaboard World Airlines v. Tiger Int'l Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 361-62 (2dCir. 1979).
224. In re LTV, 88 F.R.D. at 144. For other cases discussing the "fraud on the market"
theory and the efficient market theory see Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,645 (Mar. 9, 1988); T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth.,
717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Linde v. T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc.,
104 S. Ct. 1285 (1984); Lipton v. Documetion, Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1984); Panzirer
v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated sub nom. Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 459
U.S. 1027 (1982); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1102 (1982); In re New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 632 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1980); Ross v.
A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 552 F.2d 1239
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied sub nom. Roberts v. Barrack, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). See also Fishel, Use
of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities,
38 Bus. LAW. 1 (1982) (discussing fraud on the market theory and suggesting application of
theory to cases); Pickholz & Horahan, supra note 197, at 956 (describing recent cases and
suggesting reassessment in terms of efficient market theory).
225. See supra note 223.
226. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,645 (Mar. 8, 1988).
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presentations can distort the intrinsic value of the stock. As the courts and
others have recognized, these problems should be addressed individually by
sanctions for insider trading or under a fraud on the market theory of
liability.227 The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, therefore, should be
considered more a recognition of fact than theory, 22 and should be useful
for all purposes in evaluating securities regulation unless otherwise strongly
indicated.
Economists in the 1950s and 1960s also developed the "portfolio theory ' 229
which, combined with the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, helps explain
the price determinations of the capital markets. In an efficient market,
modern portfolio theory indicates that the expected returns are equal for all
securities having the same degree of risk.2 30 Under this theory, the value of
a security is a function of its expected return to the investor, after adjusting
for the degree of uncertainty inherent in the expected return. The expected
return includes periodic payments such as interest or dividends and expected
security price variations in the future. 23 The market evaluates and prices all
securities according to risk-return relationships. This indicates that invest-
ments should not be evaluated individually, but only in comparison with
other securities, as does the market. The theory indicates that the risks of
individual securities can be almost eliminated by a diversified portfolio of
securities. The suitability of a particular security should be based only on
its contribution to the diversification and risk of the total portfolio, and not
on its individual factors alone. 23 2
This modern economic theory casts doubt upon the usefulness of the
mandatory disclosures of federal securities laws. Portfolio theory, which
teaches that diversification can almost eliminate the risk as to a particular
security, delimits the value of disclosures and presents substantial cost/benefit
questions regarding mandatory disclosure. 233 In developed markets, infor-
mation about companies, from every possible source, is widely and quickly
disseminated and is reflected in the price of the security long before the
information is available through mandatory disclosure. This further suggests
that mandatory disclosures may have little value. 23 4 Disclosure, on the other
hand, does require a significant cost both to the issuer and to the capital
market as a whole. If costs exceed the benefits, mandatory disclosure may
also be counterproductive to the capital markets due to the resulting misal-
location of resources.
227. See id.
228. Banoff, supra note 179, at 183.
229. Note, supra note 120, at 1034-38.
230. Id. at 1039 n.34.
231. Id. at 1036 n.25.
232. Kripke, Has the SEC Taken All the Dead Wood Out of Its Disclosure System?, 38
Bus. LAw 833, 841 (1983).
233. Kripke, Where Are We On Securities Disclosure After the Advisory Committee
Report?, 6 SEc. REG. L.J. 99, 120-21 (1978).
234. Id. at 108.
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In the modern securities markets, an entire industry of investment analysts
-and advisers, broker-dealers, institutional investors, arbitragers, and a so-
phisticated financial press sort through all sources of available information
such as press and earnings releases, informal communications with manage-
ment, news reports, insider trading observations, and other sources of com-
pany specific information. 235 These sources not only provide information
similar to that required by mandatory disclosure, but also less tangible
information such as personal observations and expectations of management
and others. Although the securities industry utilizes the mandatory disclosures
of federal law, it may do so largely for validation purposes or purposes
irrelevant to the valuation of securities under a modern economic theory.
Whether provided to sophisticated or unsophisticated investors, the untime-
liness of mandatory disclosure precludes its usefulness in the valuation of a
security. Past information, reflected in the price of a security, is of no value
for trading purposes or for the prediction of future performance as a security.
Furthermore, as to individual investors, the quantity and complexity of
mandatory disclosures and the availability of such, disclosures make it im-
possible for an individual investor to sort through disclosure documents. 236
The SEC, nevertheless, has consistently focused its mandatory disclosures
on the concept of fully informed individual investors. 23 7 Realistically, indi-
vidual investors rely on the securities industry and the capital markets to
make investment decisions. 238 Untimely, complex and multitudinous man-
datory disclosures cannot compete with a fully informed securities industry
and an efficient capital market. As modern economic theory indicates,
subsequent mandatory disclosure is not important since the information has
already been translated into the price of the security. Subsequent mandatory
disclosure, therefore, is not useful for any present or future trading purposes.
The market also accounts for all data: company-specific, industry-wide,
economic, tangible, and intangible information. Mandatory disclosure cannot
possibly hope to disclose all the information available about a specific
company and its relationship to the market. Under the modern portfolio
theory, it is the expected relationship of a company to the market or to a
portfolio which is important, not the historical company-specific informa-
tion. 23 9
Although the integrated disclosure system purports to accept the efficient
market theory, the SEC has expressed considerable uncertainty about the
market working efficiently as a whole. The SEC wanted to "assure that
information about the issuer and the securities was available publicly and
that some type of market in the securities existed . . . and [that] the market
price would be established by reasonably well-informed investors in the open
235. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6231 (Sept. 2, 1980).
236. Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman 28 Bus. LAW. 631 (1973).
237. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT supra note 96, at 347-49.
238. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.(CCH) 93,645 (Mar. 8, 1988).
239. Kripke, supra note 233, at 99-132.
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market." '2 10 The SEC, therefore, in order to assure a substantial following
of the security by analysts, limited the availability of the full benefits of the
integrated disclosure system to only the largest publicly held companies with
a sufficient market capitalization. 24' Although acknowledging that the market
analyzes information and translates it into price, the SEC required that the
information already reflected in the price of the security continue to be
incorporated by reference into the prospectus from previously filed Exchange
Act reports. 242 Consequently, the in terrorem liabilities of issuers and other
persons involved in the issue apply to the perfunctory disclosures which
become incorporated by reference. 241
The position of the SEC largely conflicts with indications that the Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis can be used as a valid basis for securities regu-
lation, except in a very limited context. The theory indicates that it is of no
consequence to repeat information, however, the SEC has accepted this
axiom only for the largest companies. The theory also indicates that the
perfunctory incorporation by reference requirement serves no valid disclosure
purpose. Therefore, it merely exists to extend 1933 Act liabilities. Further-
more, many mandatory disclosures are of limited or questionable value and
cannot compete with other sources of information or the functioning of an
efficient capital market. If the theory is accepted as valid for most practical
purposes, then it becomes apparent that there is greater room for simplifi-
cation and the elimination of redundancy and unnecessary disclosures in
securities regulations. The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis indicates the
opportunity for more deregulation of mandatory disclosures. At a minimum,
the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis supports efforts toward the elimi-
nation of duplicative disclosures and procedures that continue to exist even
under the integrated disclosure system.
VII. CONTINUING PROBLEMS OF SECURITIES REGULATION
For many companies, the integrated disclosure system has reduced the
costs of compliance with federal securities laws without any loss of investment
information or investor protection. 2" Registrants, however, must still con-
tinue to satisfy the requirements of two or more separate acts. Static regis-
tration of an issue of securities is required under the 1933 Act, whether or
not a reporting company under the continuous disclosure system of the 1934
Act. According to Milton Cohen, this result is merely a historical accident.2 4 5
240. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5879 (Nov. 2, 1977).
241. See supra note 197, at 949.
242. Id.
243. Pickholz & Horahan, supra note 197, at 956.
244. Banoff, supra note 183, at 184.
245. Cohen, Toward Coordination of 1933 and 1934 Act Disclosure Requirements, 22 Bus.
LAW. 810, 811 (1967). See also Loss, supra note 136, at 28.
[TIhere is the problem that results from what might be called the archaic centrality
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If the 1934 Act had been enacted first, the result might have been different.
Under this scenario, companies under the 1934 Act would not have static
reporting requirements dependent upon the issue of securities, although they
might have other reporting requirements under the 1934 Act.24
Another continuing problem is that securities legislation and its goals have
not changed significantly since enactment in 1933 and 1934. The basic scheme
of the original Acts continues to be enforced by the SEC, with an emphasis
on the putative goals of the Acts, even though the original Acts were quickly
enacted with an objective of short-term economic recovery. 47 The SEC has
generally focused on these goals in "attempting to improve the morality of
the marketplace ... [believing] that the economic effect is largely irrelevant
... ,,"24 The Acts have continued to regulate the securities industry in spite
of significant changes in both the nature of the economy and the securities
industry.
Unlike the circumstances leading to the 1933 and 1934 legislation, there
has been a substantial period of sustained investor confidence in the U.S.
securities markets, in spite of greater volatility, with progressively greater
amounts of capital investment. Today, there are more sophisticated institu-
tional investors, largely nonexistent in 1933, which account for a large portion
of the aggregate investment in the securities markets. 249 Although today's
markets include more individual investors, financing margins are limited and
more investors are fully invested in the market on a long term basis. In
response to the greater availability of capital and investors, a large, sophis-
ticated industry of financial analyst intermediaries was spawned. In contrast,
investment advisors were nonexistent in the 1920s.2 0 The SEC itself admitted
that "this country has a uniquely active and responsive financial press which
facilitates the broad dissemination of highly timely and material company-
oriented information to a vast readership.92 5'
The capital markets have also changed drastically since 1933. Today there
are new types of securities and distribution techniques which place less
of Section 5, the registration section of the Securities Act of 1933. After all,
when the Securities Act was passed, the registration provision there applicable to
public offerings was the only disclosure devise. Today we have the proxy state-
ment, we have the annual report, we have other disclosure devises; and yet the
Securities Act has not been changed ....
Id.
246. Cohen, supra note Ill at 1381, 1406-08.
247. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
248. Ferber, The Case Against Insider Trading: A Response to Professor Manne, 23 VAND.
L. REV. 621, 622 (1970). At the time of this article the author was the SEC's chief appellate
litigator. See also Kripke, supra note 6, at 261-62 n.13.
249. See Longstreth, The SEC After Fifty Years: An Assessment of Its Past and Future,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1593, 1610-12 (1983).
250. Id. See also J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET-A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN FINANCE (1982) (comprehensive history
of SEC and securities industry).
251. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6231 (Sept. 2, 1980).
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reliance on the traditional underwriting process, creating perplexity in clas-
sifying them for registration or exemption. "Changing economic conditions
and technology have led to new financial services industries. It has become
increasingly difficult to distinguish among the banking, securities, and other
financial services industries. "252 These and other factors have led to decreased
reliance upon underwriters by issuers and investors. There is greater volatility
in interest rates, securities prices, and the movement of capital. In addition,
there is a greater international scope of the capital and securities markets.
More foreign investors seek capital in the U.S. and U.S. investors have a
growing interest in foreign markets, especially the Eurobond market. This
internationalization of the securities markets has created tension between the
regulated U.S. markets and the "unregulated" Eurodollar market. Due to
the U.S. securities laws, Eurodollar and other foreign securities generally are
not offered in the U.S., forcing U.S. investors to find other means of
investing in foreign issues. To the extent that foreign investors are reluctant
to submit to the burdens and costs of U.S. securities laws, foreign investment
sources become unavailable to U.S. investors and the efficient international
allocation of capital is impeded. 253
252. Shad, Introduction-Fifty Years of Federal Securities Regulation-Symposium on
Contemporary Problems in Securities Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 545, 545-46 (1984). At the
time of the article, John S.R. Shad was Chairman of the SEC. The Glass-Steagall Act requires
that investment banking functions be distinct from commercial banking. 12 U.S.C. § 227
(1982 & Supp. III 1985). This distinction is becoming increasingly blurred. For a history of
investment banking and the securities industry, see United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp.
621, 635-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
253. Id. See Note, Foreign Securities: Integration and Disclosure Under the Securities and
Exchange Acts, 58 NOTRE DAME L. Rav. 911 (1983).
As the world trade has increased in the last twenty-five years, many corporations
have taken a more international view toward sources of capital. While American
corporations have sought capital abroad, many foreign corporations have entered
the United States capital markets to secure short and long-term financing ....
The American investor may acquire securities in four basic forms: 1) 'ordinary'
securities-issued in the foreign country of origin; 2) 'American' securities-
issued specifically for the American market with procedural rights differing from
ordinary securities; 3) American Depository Receipts (ADR)-issued by an Amer-
ican bank and representing the underlying 'ordinary' security; and 4) American
investment funds-a domestic holding company which holds the foreign 'ordinary'
security. An American investor can purchase these foreign securities in three
major markets either directly or through an American broker/dealer: 1) the
original foreign market-where the investor pays higher transaction costs; 2) the
American over-the-counter market-through the active National Association of
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) system or through the in-
active National Daily Quotation Sheets, the 'pink sheet' market; and 3) the
American national security exchanges-where active and widely held foreign
securities can be purchased.
Foreign debt securities, known as 'Yankee' bonds, comprise the majority of
the foreign securities market. Foreign governmental issuers dominate this bond
market but foreign corporate issuers have recently become more active. . . .The
major American purchasers are institutional investors seeking risk diversification
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The securities laws have created a system whereby industry self-regulation,
which generally was unsupervised prior to 1934, is now coordinated with
SEC regulation. In principle, such a scheme has theoretical appeal, however,
it has been largely underutilized. During much of its history, the SEC has
neglected its supervisory role over self-regulatory organizations and has
concentrated instead on the enforcement of its own disclosure requirements.
Attempts to alleviate the evident failures in this area resulted in overlapping
and confusing rules. Self-regulation, therefore, continues to be underutilized
due to the unclear and overlapping responsibilities that result from inaction
of self-regulatory organizations as well as the SEC.
25 4
and attracted by the slight interest premium 'Yankee' bonds carry. These insti-
tutional investors usually have direct access to the competing Eurobond market.
Thus, the 'Yankee' bond market and the Eurobond market have overlapping
roles.
Equity securities play a smaller but more visible role. Foreign corporations have
diverse reasons for entering the United States stock market ....
In addition to foreign corporations who voluntarily enter the United States
markets by issuing new stock, other foreign corporations have stock traded in
United States secondary markets. Some foreign corporations either avoid or
actively discourage American trading in their shares. These corporations' shares
are normally traded on the inactive 'pink sheet' market....
From its inception, the SEC required foreign firms issuing new securities to
conform to substantially the same Securities Act disclosure standards placed on
United States issuers. This attitude especially handicapped foreign issuers because
of their unequal initial position. Many foreign corporations preferred to avoid
the rigors of Securities Act registration and thus, the American markets. As
business became more international in scope and more foreign firms wanted to
use the United States capital markets, the SEC's Securities Act disclosure require-
ments became more of a barrier to the free flow of international capital.
Id. at 911-15 (footnotes omitted). See also Thomas, Internationalization of the Securities
Markets: An Empirical Analysis, 50 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 155 (1982) (empirical analysis
suggesting that benefits to American investors and to United States economy associated with
the entry of foreign issuers into the United States market outweigh costs of such entry).
254. See Lipton, Governance of Our Securities Markets and the Failure to Allocate
Regulatory Responsibility, 34 CATH. U.L. REv. 397, 398 (1985); Smythe, Government Su-
pervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for
an Accommodation, 62 N.C.L. REV. 475, 487 (1984); see also Silver v. N.Y.S.E., 373 U.S.
341, 351-52 (1963) (definitive statement on balance between government and self-regulation
inherent in federal securities laws).
Over the past half century, the SEC developed a split personality in administering
the basic securities laws. One SEC, highly respected and highly visible to the
public, administers the system of mandatory disclosure of information by publicly
traded companies and enforces the laws' anti-fraud provisions. The regulatory
SEC, less visible and poorly understood, is charged with a variety of responsi-
bilities involving the overall health and effective operation of the securities
markets. For thirty-five years, the regulatory SEC did little to discharge those
responsibilities.
Werner, The SEC As A Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 755, 783 (1984). See generally
Chepucavage, Self-Regulation in a National Market Environment, SEC. L. REV. 313, 347-61
(1983) (recommending elimination of multi-tier regulatory overlap and other proposals for
self-regulation in a national market environment).
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Federal securities laws continue to supplement state corporate and "Blue
Sky" laws without federal preemption, in spite of the fact that most issuers,
as well as the entire security industry, have become more national and
international in scope. 215 A large securities issue in a federally regulated
market, however, might be required to comply with fifty different state
securities laws if offered in those states. If federal securities laws are adequate
for the protection of investors in the national market then redundant state
regulations become unnecessarily burdensome, costly and inefficient. This
state and federal redundancy results in the inefficient allocation of resources
in the capital markets. 26
Many recent sources have been critical of the securities laws 25 7 after years
of acceptance. There is a general agreement among the legal, financial, and
economic communities that securities laws should not impede the efficient
allocation of resources in the capital markets, without substantial justification
that the benefits exceed the costs of regulation. 258 This agreement, however,
conflicts with the original legislative premises which disregarded the costs
and benefits of regulation. Also, overwhelming support exists for modern
economic theory, which casts substantial doubt on the necessity and value
of securities law disclosures.2 5 9 On the other hand, little empirical or theo-
retical support exists for the present mandated disclosure system. The SEC
continues to administer laws and regulations which are subjective ad hoc
means advancing the broad goals of full disclosure and investor protection.
The SEC has expanded these subjective regulations in recent years to require
more disclosures without any empirical studies indicating their need or
255. The federal securities acts expressly allow for concurrent state regulation under the
blue sky laws. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r, 78bb (1982 & Supp. III 1985). "Blue Sky" law is the name
generally applied to a state's securities laws. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539
(1917) (these laws are known as "blue sky" laws after this opinion describing their purpose
as the prevention "of speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of
blue sky").
256. See Campbell, An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J. CORP.
L. 553 (1985) (suggesting that the costs imposed on the capital raising system far outweigh
any benefits); Brandi, Securities Practitioners and Blue Sky Laws: A Survey of Comments
and a Ranking of States by Stringency of Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 689 (1985) (finding
that the inconsistency in merit review among the states is the principle part of the cost of
regulation).
257. See supra notes 107-66 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 123-24.
259. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
Modern economic analysis has gravely weakened, if not irretrievably damaged,
the theoretical basis for the mandatory disclosure system of securities legislation
enforced by the SEC. Even if it is assumed that some mandatory disclosure is
necessary, any fair-minded observer must at least recognize that the rationalization
for the system is so dubious that the burden of proving the need for a regulatory
structure, or any part of it, has shifted from the critics to the supporters of the
system.
Wolfson, A Critique of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 30 EMORY L.J. 119, 165
(1981).
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value.26 Like the Federal Securities Code, most of present securities regu-
lation is "lawyers law" with little or no consideration of other disciplines
or the costs and benefits of regulation;2 61 such regulation implicitly assumes
that the benefits to society outweigh the costs. Although such assumptions
may be appropriate where the benefits are great and the costs are minor, in
this case, there are indications that the value of the benefits is minor or
nonexistent, and the cost to the capital markets as a whole is great. These
indications should be considered, unless society determines that the cost of
the regulation is irrelevant to the law.
The SEC has continued to emphasize disclosures for the benefit and
protection of the individual investor. 262 This misplaced emphasis has, how-
ever, resulted in an incongruous result. SEC disclosures are required to be
readable and understandable by laymen. Therefore, technical language and
unnecessary detail must be avoided.2 6 This oversimplification, however,
makes the mandatory disclosures less useful to the professional analysts who
actually use them. In its emphasis on individual investor protection, the SEC
has historically prohibited anything other than "hard," tangible, verifiable,
and historic data. 264 Much, if not all, "hard" data may be worthless as it
260. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. The prohibitions on disclosure under the
1933 Act have also been argued to violate the first amendment right to freedom of speech
considering the Supreme Court's extension of protections offered to commercial speech. See
Schoeman, The First Amendment and Restrictions on Advertising of Securities Under the
Securities Act of 1933, 41 Bus. LAW. 377 (1986).
261. Lowenfells, supra note 141, at 657 n.233.
262. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
263. 17 C.F.R. § 230.406(0 (1987). Cf. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332
F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971):
The view that the prospectuses should be intelligible to the average small investor
as well as the professional analyst, immediately raises the question of what
substantive standard of disclosure must be maintained ....
In an industry in which there is an unmistakable 'trend toward a greater measure
of professionalism ... with the accompanying demand for more information
about issuers' 'a pragmatic balance must be struck between the needs of the
unsophisticated investor and those of the knowledgeable student of finance.' The
Wheat Report at 9-10. There are three distinct classes of investors who must be
informed by the prospectus: (1) the amateur who reads for only the grosser sorts
of disclosures; (2) the professional advisor and manager who studies the prospectus
closely and makes his decisions based on the insights he gains from it; and (3)
the securities analyst who uses the prospectus as one of many sources in an
independent investigation of the issuer . ...
The significance of these observations is that the objectives of full disclosure
can be fully achieved only by complete revelation of facts which would be material
to the sophisticated investor or the securities professional not just the average
common shareholder.
Id. at 565-66. See also Greenapple v. Detroit Edison Co., 618 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoted
supra note 19).
264. See Schneider, Nits, Grits and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REv.
254 (1972). The ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT also noted this problem:
Although it is at least arguable that the statutory disclosure system created by
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has no value in predicting future performance and, therefore, has no rele-
vance to the value of a security. 265 The SEC has recently liberalized its
position on this matter by permitting and encouraging voluntary forecasts,
and requiring discussion of liquidity and capital resources, i.e. "soft" data. 266
However, unnecessary issuer involvement in this area opens up the possibility
of substantial civil liability. 267 The value of this change, therefore, is limited
as registrants are reluctant to disclose anything which is not "hard," tangible,
and verifiable. Consequently, registrants continue to emphasize historical
data, notwithstanding its limited or negligible value.
Under the 1933 Act, Section 11 imposes absolute liability on the issuer
and establishes a negligence standard for others involved in the issuance of
securities. 26 This is in contrast to the scienter standard of liability generally
required under the 1934 Act. 269 Section 12 also establishes a high liability
standard. 270 Although the in terrorem liability provision may have prevented
fraudulent or misleading disclosures in registration statements, it also had
an antiseptic effect on the quality of the disclosures, since it punishes as
fraudulent any negligent or inadvertent noncompliance with the 1933 Act by
the issuer. 27' This liability is available in addition to the other antifraud
penalties. 272 The prospectus has become a "schizophrenic ' 27 document which
the 1933 and 1934 Acts was perceived by Congress and commentators as being
particularly suited to the interests of sophisticated investors and securities profes-
sionals, for many years the policy of the [SEC] was based on the belief that the
relevant constituency was the unsophisticated investor.
The disclosure objective of providing meaningful information to the investment
community has, in cases of perceived conflict, been subordinated to the objective
of protecting unsophisticated investors from their own ignorance. Thus, for
example, the [SEC] has excluded certain types of information, although useful
and important to knowledgeable constituents of the investment community, might
be misunderstood and unduly relied upon by unsophisticated investors.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 97, at 347-49.
265. See supra notes 233-39 and accompanying text.
266. See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 5992 (Nov. 7, 1978) (guides for disclosure
of projections of future economic performance) and SEC Securities Act Release No. 6084
(June 25, 1979) (safe harbor rules for projections).
267. See, e.g., Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341, 347-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (liability for
misleading projections). In some cases, however, projections may be required, see Plaine v.
McCabe, 790 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1986); Lockspeiser v. Western Maryland Co., 768 F.2d 558
(4th Cir. 1985); Flynn v. Bass Brothers Enterprises Inc., 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984).
268. See supra notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
272. Id.
273. Schneider & Manko, Going Public-Practices, Procedures and Consequences, 15 VILL.
L. REv. 283, 293 (1970).
The prospectus is a somewhat schizophrenic document, having two purposes
which often present conflicting pulls. On the one hand, it is a selling document.
It is used by the principal underwriters to form the underwriting syndicate and a
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tries to function as both a selling and a disclosure document, subject to the
in terrorem liabilities of the Act. As a result, disclosures are very conservative,
rigid in format and content and contain meaningless, standard "boilerplate"
provisions to avoid liability. The prospectus, therefore, has become somewhat
of an insurance policy against liability rather than a balanced, informative
selling document. 274
The in terrorem liabilities under the 1933 Act not only impair the quality
of disclosure under the Act, but also have other unjustified consequences.
Without a showing of need for such liability for investor protection, they
impose what amounts to absolute liability on issuers for inadvertent failures
to comply with the 1933 Act. This may not only result from an error in
disclosure, but also from a failure to comply with the exact requirements of
one of the exemptions under the Act. Such a result may occur due to
innocent and unforeseen events, such as the integration of two offerings or
may be due to mere technical disqualification rather than any substantive
transgression. 27 Therefore, there are no social policy reasons for liabilities
under the 1933 Act unless the primary securities market is so fraught with
dealer group, and by the underwriters and dealers to sell the securities to the
public. From this point of view, it is desirable to present the best possible image.
On the other hand, the prospectus is a disclosure document, an insurance policy
against liability. With the view toward protection against liability, there is a
tendency to resolve all doubts against the company and to make things look as
bleak as possible. In balancing the purposes, established underwriters and expe-
rienced counsel, guided at least in part by their knowledge of the SEC staff
attitudes, traditionally lean to a very conservative presentation. They avoid glow-
ing adjectives, subjective evaluations and predictions about the future. The pro-
spectus is limited to provable statements of historic fact.
Id.
274. Id. See also Schneider, supra note 264. Compare Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1971):
'[E]ven where an investor [is] presented with an accurate prospectus prior to his
purchase, the presentation in most instances tend[s] to discourage reading by all
but the most knowledgeable and tenacious . . . . ' These documents are often
drafted so as to be comprehensible to only a minute part of the investing public
.... In at least some instances, what has developed in lieu of the open disclosure
envisioned by the Congress is a literary art form calculated to communicate as
little of the essential information as possible while exuding an air of total candor.
Masters of this medium utilize turgid prose to enshroud the occasional critical
revelation in a morass of dull, and-to all but the sophisticates-useless financial
and historical data. In the face of such obfuscatory tactics the common or even
the moderately well informed investor is almost as much at the mercy of the
issuer as was his pre-SEC parent. He cannot by reading the prospectus discern
the merit of the offering.
Using a statement to obscure, rather than reveal, in plain English, the critical
elements of a proposed business deal cannot be countenanced under the securities
regulation acts.
Id. at 549.
275. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
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risk that it cannot be remedied by a lesser standard of liability. 276 The
different standards under the Acts have also resulted in preferring investors
in primary offerings of securities to those in the secondary market. If, as
has been indicated, investors do not rely on the mandatory disclosures for
investment decisions, the higher standard of liability would seem to be
unjustified. As a consequence, it has the effect of inefficient resource allo-
cation since foreign issuers are reluctant to submit to the 1933 Act liabilities.
U.S. issuers also avoid the threat of liability by avoiding issuance of securities
or by obtaining capital through one of the exemptions. 27
Certain exemptions under the 1933 Act are intended mainly to avoid the
burden of registration by small companies for small financing. Due to the
risk of failure to qualify, much cost and effort is often necessary to insure
qualification under one of the exemptions. Because of the technical nature
of the various exemptions and exceptions, which can disqualify an exemption,
the cost and burden of an exempt offering for a small company may be
greater than an actual registration under the Act. 278 The 1933 Act has been
described as unnecessarily "sophistic" due to the technical nature of these
exemptions and the related doctrines of integration, fungibility, and restricted
securities, among others. 279 The result is that, notwithstanding the exemp-
tions, the cost of compliance, complexity of regulations, and regulatory
barriers continue to hinder small issuers and small financing. 80 The decrease
in supply increases the cost of investments to investors. The high compliance
costs increase the costs of both small and large issuers. For many large U.S.
issuers, the "unregulated" Eurodollar market offers an alternative by avoid-
ing the U.S. markets and its securities laws entirely. 281 The resulting distortion
in the market causes inefficient resource allocation and burdens the U.S.
capital markets as a whole. The efficient allocation of international resources
is also impeded by U.S. laws.
VIII. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Reform of federal securities laws can be accomplished without impairing
the SEC goals of full disclosure, investor protection, and confidence in the
276. McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 45. See also Loss, Keynote Address: The Federal
Securities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1431, 1441 (1979):
Strict liability may be sensible when you choose to keep lions in your backyard.
You know that a lion is a dangerous creature, and if it escapes, negligent or not,
you are going to be liable. You should be. But, when you impose strict liability
on an underlying body of substantive law that is as spongy as the Securities Act,
you have the worst possible jurisprudence that I can imagine.
Id.
277. Id.
278. Wolfson, supra note 259, at 149-56.
279. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
280. Wolfson, supra note 259.
281. See supra note 253.
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capital markets. The SEC has demonstrated this by adopting the integrated
disclosure system. Form S-3, which eliminates duplicative SEC filings, is
popular and less costly to issuers. Yet, it has not resulted in any impairment
to capital markets, investors, or disclosure. The success of Rule 415 indicates
further that there is no benefit in registering securities issues and that the
elimination of this requirement for 1934 Act companies would benefit issuers,
investors, and the capital market as a whole.282 Modern economic theory
and empirical studies also indicate the need for continued reform. 283
Although the integrated disclosure system was a success, its benefits are
limited. The full benefits of integrated disclosure are available only to the
largest companies that can file Form S-3 and use Rule 415.284 Otherwise, the
duplicative nature of the two separate acts continues to apply, in varying
degrees, to most of the other registrants. Furthermore, the integrated disclo-
sure system does not fully acknowledge the empirical evidence and economic
theory, nor the evidence of its own success. Registration under the 1933 Act
continues to be necessary for all registrants upon the event of an offering
of securities, whether or not they are complying registrants under the 1934
Act. Even though integrated disclosure avoids the replication of information
between filings for some companies, the information must be incorporated
by reference from the 1934 Act filings. There continues to be a perfunctory
requirement to deliver the prospectus to the individual investor who, in all
likelihood, will not use it. However, it need not be delivered until the
securities are delivered."' In addition, there is the possibility of liability
under the in terrorem liability provisions of Section 11.286
There is a need for comprehensive legislative reform. The bureaucratic,
timid, and tradition-bound SEC took fifteen years to adopt an integrated
disclosure system. 27 The SEC did not even make this system generally
available, but significantly limited its usefulness. Nonetheless, it was accused
of exceeding its authority and violating the Congressional mandates of the
1933 and 1934 Acts. 28 The SEC, therefore, is at the border of its rulemaking
authority with the integrated disclosure system. It can only continue to
provide more patchwork solutions. Meaningful reform requires reconsider-
ation of securities laws on a more fundamental level.
Unlike the background of the 1933 Act, proposals for change should not
be made without substantial theoretical support, empirical justification, and
a consideration of the costs and benefits of regulation. The failures of the
Federal Securities Code indicate that the proposals for reform cannot be
mere ad hoc, subjective "lawyer's law. ' ' 289 Legal reform of the securities
282. See supra notes 167-99 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 107-35, 200-43 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 175-99 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 107-35 and accompanying text.
288. See Pickholz & Horahan, supra note 197, at 963.
289. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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laws can no longer ignore economic, financial, accounting and business
interests. Although the scheme proposed by the Federal Securities Code
floundered, the goals and premises underlying the Code are relevant with
respect to proposals for reform. 290 The criticisms detailed in previous sections 291
and the problems of securities regulation, 292 continue to reflect a need for
further reform.
This Comment does not propose to dismantle and abandon the entire
mandatory disclosure system, although there is support indicating that man-
datory disclosure has little or no value. 293 Such a drastic proposal would
appear radical and could be challenged, as it has been in the past, with
logical arguments to the contrary. Proponents of mandatory disclosure argue
that it is necessary for investor confidence in the capital markets. It is argued
that without civil and criminal sanctions voluntary and other sources of
corporate information will not be adequate, will allow for concealment or
misrepresentation of information, and will result in excessive executive and
underwriter compensation.294 These arguments attempt to challenge the basis
of modern economic theory and question the validity of contrary empirical
studies. Furthermore, regulation by mandatory disclosure has become an
institution of the securities industry. Proponents also argue that it would be
unrealistic to expect Congress to abandon the philosophy of full disclosure
which has been viewed historically as the "linchpin of investor protection ' 295
290. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 107-35 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 175-99 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
294. Seligman, supra note 108, at 9. In addition to this article, several others have recently
stated support of present and historical securities laws in a "post-revisionist" movement.
See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549
(1984) (questioning Benston's conclusions on the cost and inefficiency of 1934 Act disclosures);
Levmore, Efficient Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries, 70 VA. L. REV. 645 (1984) (high-
lighting the difference in approach to securities regulation by economists and lawyers and
suggesting a legal approach); Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984) (concluding that although there is no good evidence
that the disclosure rules are beneficial, there is also no good evidence that they are harmful
or overly costly); Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984).
We therefore may be approaching a new stage, which can be called 'post-
revisionism.' Among post-revisionism's defining characteristics are (1) a recog-
nition of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis as, at the least, the best
generalization by which to summarize the available empirical evidence; (2) a
clearer sense of the difficulties inherent in relying on aggregate statistical evidence
either to prove or rebut any broad thesis about the impact and effects of
disclosure; and (3) a shift in focus from continued debate over the impact the
federal securities laws had fifty years ago to an examination of contemporary
market structure and the needs of investors under existing conditions.
Id. at 719-20. As this Comment does not recommend the abrogation of mandatory disclosure,
the proposals herein should not be anathemical to adherents of "post-revisionism."
295. See Throop, supra note 163, at 1600.
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and that the "empirical realities of the familiar capital markets best dem-
onstrate that the efficient market hypothesis is interesting but often irrelevant
to the law." 2 96 It is argued as sufficient for the law to reflect a rational
analysis backed by experience.297 There is also evidence that the mandatory
disclosure system has been beneficial to the capital markets. One such benefit
is that mandatory disclosure subsidizes the search for similar information
by financial analysts, thereby reducing the cost of duplicative efforts and
promoting more efficient resource allocation on an overall basis. 29 Although
a proposal to abandon the concept of mandatory disclosure would be
hazardous, certain broad proposals can be justified through empirical studies,
economic theory, and the results of the integrated disclosure system.
IX. PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Although the ALI Federal Securities Code failed, the concept of replacing
the registration of securities with the registration of companies is sound. The
Code attempted to codify all securities regulation statutes into one compre-
hensive code. This Comment does not propose a comprehensive recodifica-
tion. Many of the problems of securities laws addressed by the Code and
others can be solved more simply. A continuous company registration scheme,
much like that sought by the proponents of the Code, can be achieved by
repealing the 1933 Act and by replacing 1933 Act registrations with 1934
Act disclosures for new and current registrants.
A proposal for the complete repeal of the 1933 Act can be justified. The
present scheme of the two Acts is an anachronism due to an historical
accident.29 9 The success of the integrated disclosure system, especially the
results of Rule 415, shows that this can be accomplished without impairing
disclosure, investor protection, or the capital markets.3°° The elimination of
the registration requirement upon the event of a securities offering, however,
can be expected to reduce the cost of offerings to issuers, investors, and the
capital markets as a whole.30 The repeal of the 1933 Act, along with its
attendant in terrorem liabilities, would remove significant impediments to
national and international capital formation.30 2
If this change is to be accomplished without abandoning the concept of
mandatory disclosure, additional disclosures under the 1934 Act will be
required. Rather than a registration of a securities issue, it is suggested that
a securities issue should be treated like other reportable events under the
continuous disclosure system of the 1934 Act. Such a treatment has inherent
296. Levmore, supra note 294, at 650.
297. Throop, supra note 163, at 1600.
298. See Coffee, supra note 294, at 729.
299. See Note, supra note 119.
300. See supra notes 167-99.
301. Id.
302. See supra notes 268-77 and accompanying text.
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logic. The issue of securities by a registrant may be as significant to a holder
of issued and outstanding securities as it is to a purchaser of the offering.
The disclosures under the 1934 Act are more balanced and informative than
those of the 1933 Act. They also offer the advantage of being produced
periodically, compared to the static reporting requirements of the 1933 Act.
It is apparent that individual investors cannot benefit from the historical
accident of the two Acts if mandatory disclosure is not abrogated. The
success of the common disclosure package under the integrated disclosure
system supports this assertion. Further support exists in that individual
investors do not use the 1933 Act disclosure documents for investment
purposes. Financial intermediaries would not be affected since they would
continue to have access to the disclosures under the 1934 Act.
It has been suggested by Milton Cohen that 1934 Act disclosure can be
substituted for 1933 Act registration by treating events much like a "fun-
damental" event under shelf registration. This could be reported by filing a
Form 8-K with the SEC and the Exchange or the National Association of
Securities Dealers. 303 Financial intermediaries would disseminate the infor-
mation largely as they do now, and the market would quickly reflect the
event in the market price of the stock. For new registrants, the event of an
offering would require not only registration of the event, but also initial
registration under the continuous reporting requirements of the 1934 Act.
Unlike the Code, this Comment does not propose to continue any type of
static registration statement such as an "offering statement," "distribution
statement," or "a prospectus delivery requirement more or less as in present
law." 31 4 The acceptance of an efficient capital market for purposes of
securities regulation supports this position.
Such a change would benefit both large and small registrants. Registrants
would no longer have to register offerings and the cost benefit to all
registrants is apparent. Not only would the repeal of the 1933 Act reduce
303. See Cohen, The Integrated Disclosure System- Unfinished Business, 40 Bis. LAW.
987, 991 (1985).
Yet I wonder whether the items of Form 8-K might not usefully be expanded...
to cover some major events not presently specified. Or if additional specification
is impractical, perhaps we can at least take a cue from item 512 of regulation S-
K in which a new word, 'fundamental,' is introduced. A registrant in a rule 415
shelf offering must undertake to file a posteffective amendment of the prospectus
to reflect 'any facts or events arising after the effective date . . .which, individ-
ually or in the aggregate, represent a fundamental change in the information set
forth in the registration statement' or must disclose the fundamental change in a
1934 Act report incorporated by reference. Would it not be practical as well as
desirable to require a registrant similarly to report changes in the information
contained in its continuous disclosure file that are not merely material but
fundamental, rather than waiting for the next 10-K or the next public offering
to do so? The point is far from trivial. To the extent that users can rely on filed
data as not only accurate but current, the usefulness of continuous disclosure
files is obviously enhanced ....
Id. at 991.
304. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
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the cost of registration, it would also reduce the cost and burden of qualifying
for exemptions and would eliminate the need for the unnecessarily sophis-
ticated rules of the 1933 Act.30 It would no longer be necessary to determine
if a particular offering is a security to achieve technical compliance with the
various exemptions or to determine whether a particular exception to an
exemption would apply. Furthermore, it would be unnecessary to worry
about "jumping the gun" in advance of an offering, or about technical
compliance with the statutory prospectus delivery requirements and the
attendant liability for failure to do so. The only requirement would be
registration and reporting under the 1934 Act. 3°6
The elimination of the 1933 Act registration requirements would increase
the efficiency of the market and would allow the market itself to allocate
resources without the effect of 1933 Act regulatory distortions. Not only
would issuers benefit, but also investors and the market as a whole. The
results of Rule 415 indicate that a lower cost of issuing securities, less
dependence on traditional, high cost distribution methods, and increased
competition of securities would reduce the cost to investors and the capital
markets as a whole?07 In addition, U.S. investors would have a greater
supply of offerings, not only from U.S. companies, but also from foreign
issuers. Although progress toward an international jurisdictional and reme-
305. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. The most obvious benefit of such a system
would be the reduced cost to issuers. When one considers the fees charged by underwriters,
printers, attorneys, and accountants in connection with a registration under the 1933 Act,
the savings can be significant. It would also reduce the cost to issuers, investors, and the
capital markets as a whole by allowing innovative distribution techniques which are less costly
than the traditional fixed-price methods which rely on underwriters and syndicates. The
ability to issue securities without the ceremony of a registration would make alternative
distribution methods more practicable, as is the case with shelf registration offerings. Issuers
have at least three new methods: the "Dutch" auction, the dribble out, and the bought deal.
In Dutch auctions, the issuer accepts bids directly from investors and does not need to use
an underwriter. The issuer solicits bids on its own. Dribble outs are similarly solicited by the
issuer, however, the issuer sells in small amounts of securities as buyers appear and are
willing to accept the issuer's price. In a bought deal, the issuer circumvents underwriters by
selling directly to one or more investment banks which then resell the securities. These
techniques, where used, have reduced the cost of offerings by increasing alternatives for the
issuers and increasing competition among underwriters. The ability to issue securities as
necessary would give issuers the ability to take immediate advantage of changes in the market,
thereby decreasing their cost of an issue. Increasing the competition among underwriters
would make the market more efficient by lowering issuer and investor cost. Like shelf
registration, the proposed system would also benefit investors by bringing prices in the
primary and secondary markets into equilibrium. For a discussion of the realized benefits of
shelf registration, see Banoff, supra note 183. For other articles discussing the benefits of
alternative distribution techniques and underwriter competition, see Greene, Investment Bank-
ers-Determining the Responsibilities of Underwriters Distributing Securities Within an In-
tegrated Disclosure System, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755 (1981) and Note, Auctioning New
Issues of Corporate Securities, 71 VA. L. REv. 1381 (1985).
306. McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 45.
307. See supra note 294.
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dial system will have to continue, the elimination of the burdens of the 1933
Act registration and liabilities to foreign issuers can be expected to increase
the supply of securities available to U.S. investors, increase the competition
in securities and distribution techniques, and increase the efficient allocation
of resources in the international market to the benefit of the U.S. capital
markets as a whole.30 8
Under this securities regulation scheme, it would not be necessary to
eliminate the present in terrorem liabilities of the 1933 Act. Nonetheless,
this is recommended as part of the proposal of this Comment.3 9 It has been
308. Id.
309. See supra notes 268-77 and accompanying text. The extension of 1933 Act liabilities
to continuous reports by section 1704 of the ALI CODE caused considerable controversy:
There are at least two good reasons, however, to resist the extension of Section
11 liabilities to annual reports. First, imposition of liability upon directors,
particularly outside directors, for negligence in connection with misstatements or
omissions in an annual report is too severe and will discourage competent people
from assuming corporate directorships . . . . Second, corporate efforts to ensure
that no material information is negligently omitted from the annual report may
result in substantially larger, unreadable annual reports which contain more, but
communicate less, information to shareholders . . . . Expanding the Commission's
injunctive powers through a strict liability standard may severely penalize parties
for an innocent mistake, yet not deter future mistakes . . . . Tightening the
standard of personal liability for misstatements in annual reports may deter
qualified people from becoming directors and increase obfuscation in annual
reports. Thus, the Code's generous expansion of plaintiffs' rights-in a field
where plaintiffs already receive extensive protection-carries many dangers that
require further exploration.
Lowenfells, supra note 141, at 654-55. Professor Kripke also commented on this extension
of liability:
On another point, however, the Code adopted by the ALI in May of 1978 would
depart from present law-in my mind, very much for the worse-by imposing
strenuous liability provisions on the issuer for material misstatements in the annual
reports . . . . The stringent liability provisions of Section 11 of that Act reach
only misstatements or omissions in registration statements for newly distributed
securities. The liability provisions are onerous; plaintiffs need not even carry the
burden of proving causation or reliance on the alleged misleading statement or
omission.
Section 1704 of the Code would extend the scope of the 1933 Act liability
provisions to cover the regular annual reports of the issuer. The provisions would
apply even if the issuer had received no consideration from, and had no privity
of contract with, the person who purchased or sold securities while the annual
report was outstanding and current. The same burden of due diligence, heretofore
accepted by the financial community only in connection with Securities Act
registration statements, would be imposed on the writing of annual reports.
Securities Act registration statements are required when securities are distributed
for consideration. The attendant burden of satisfying the standard of due diligence
is, therefore, episodic. If that heavy burden were imposed on routine annual
reports, then issuers would be forced to institute, on a regular basis, all of the
extraordinary procedures for care, investigation and detailed description of cor-
porate activity previously required only occasionally. While this requirement
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argued that the Section 11 liability provision of the 1933 Act has had an
antiseptic effect on the quality of 1933 Act disclosures. 10 On the other hand,
the 1934 Act disclosures are more balanced and meaningful .31  If the in
terrorem liabilities are imposed on 1934 Act disclosures, these can also be
expected to become pessimistic, overly conservative, "boilerplate," and un-
balanced.31 2 Such cataclysmic liability has never been shown to be necessary
for investor protection, especially for technical noncompliance. The antifraud
provisions should guard against fraud, and the 1934 Act scienter requirement
for liability has been adequate for investor protection in the secondary
would enrich the legal profession, since attorneys would be bound to give the
same attention to annual reports now required for registration statements, the
result would be repugnant to concerns currently being expressed regarding over-
regulation and the unfortunate, ubiquitous necessity for securities lawyers ....
Since the primary method of disclosure has been altered from the occasional
registration statement to permanent registration coupled with the annual report,
it was asserted that both documents should therefore be subject to the same
stringent provisions.
In my opinion, just because disclosure has become continuous under the Code,
it does not necessarily follow that the cataclysmic liability provisions of Section
II are appropriate for the annual report ....
Consider, for instance, how much litigation would be fomented by this provision
if it survives. Every time a security price went up or down, unhappy stockholders,
or former stockholders, would have an opportunity to try to shift their perceived
losses to the parties liable under this section. These potential plaintiffs, having
found a material misstatement or omission in the company's current annual
report, would not need to prove that they had been aware of the misstated
information, or that they had relied on it, or that it had caused them damages.
Rather, the burden of disproving those elements would be on the defendants.
Entrepreneurial lawyers who found such plaintiffs for class suits would have a
field day, and the ensuing litigation would be interminable.
The situation would be far worse than it was under rule lOb-5, even before the
Supreme Court required scienter, because mere negligence would suffice to impose
liability under the proposed provisions. Furthermore, proof of damage would not
be required in order to state a cause of action and throw the burden of proof
onto the defendants. Not only would the potential liability run to a huge class
of plaintiffs-all persons who traded in any of the company's securities during
the currency of the annual report-but also the Code formula for limiting liability
is not severely restrictive because of the large number of potential defendants.
The situation thus invokes Chief Judge Cardozo's fears of unrestricted liability
for negligent representation, and would not conform to the Supreme Court's
interpretation that Congress is imposing liability for negligent misrepresentation
carefully limited the situations to which liability was applicable. The Supreme
Court has recognized that in this kind of litigation, the dangers of the litigation
itself and the expense thereof cause improvident settlements. Indeed, the problem
would be so serious that it might outweigh any benefits from the other provisions
of the Code.
Kripke, Securities Law Reform and the ALI Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1453, 1462-65 (1979).
310. See supra notes 268-74 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
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market.3"3 There is no valid reason for distinction between investors in
primary or secondary offerings. 1 14 Therefore, it seems plausible that the 1934
Act's scheme of liability should be sufficient to protect investors and provide
them with an adequate remedy for violations. The retention of in terrorem
liabilities would continue to impede the efficient allocation of national and
international resources by inhibiting securities offerings." 5
One question which remains open after the replacement of 1934 Act
disclosures for 1933 Act registrations is the status of transaction-specific
disclosure requirements under the 1933 Act. Under the proposal of this
Comment, it would be necessary to report the event of a securities issue in
the registrant's periodic reports on Form 8-K and possibly Forms 10-K and
10-Q. The question is whether the same type of disclosures of risks and the
resulting standard, "boilerplate" insurance policy disclosures would be nec-
essary. The elimination of in terrorem liability should help reduce the
inadequacy of such disclosures. A determination will have to be made,
however, as to whether the event needs to be disclosed with the same
requirements in all reports or whether the event can be reported much as
other events are reported under the 1934 Act in Forms 10-K and 10-Q, with
possibly full disclosure only in Form 8-K. Having concluded that the efficient
market hypothesis can and should be relied on for purposes of securities
313. See Longstreth, supra note 249, at 1612.
314. See supra note 276 and accompanying text. But see Nicholas, The Integrated Disclosure
System and its Impact Upon Underwriters' Due Diligence: Will Investors Be Protected? 11
SEc. REG. L.J. 3, 41 (1983):
Section 11 of the Securities Act was designed to provide substantially greater
protection for investors against material misstatements in and omissions from
registration statements than Section 18 of the Exchange Act provides for material
misstatements in or omissions in from periodic reports. There are important
differences between routine transactions in the secondary markets and sales of
securities pursuant to certain kinds of registered offerings which justify the
substantial protections of the Securities Act. While the registration provisions of
Section 5 of the Securities Act reach many transactions for which the full panoply
of protections provided by the registration process is excessive, there are at least
two instances in which the self-interest of the offerors and their access to inside
information are such that investors should have the full protections of the
registration process. These instances are (1) primary offerings by issuers seeking
funds from the market, and (2) large-scale secondary offerings by insiders which
exceed the volume limitations of Rule 144 and which require the services of an
underwriter and an extra selling effort. Securities sales in these instances are
significantly different from ordinary market transactions or certain other kinds
of sales registered under the Securities Act, such as block sales by institutional
investors and sales of securities pursuant to dividend reinvestment plans and
employee stock purchase plans. The risk of an issuer, eager for funds, concealing
unfavorable information, and the risk of insiders, cognizant of the unfavorable
information, 'bailing out' are too great to allow issuers and insiders to go to
market without the special scrutiny provided by the registration process.
Id.
315. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
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regulation, it is apparent that full disclosure would not be necessary more
than once in Form 8-K. Any repetitive information in subsequent reports
would have no value. Certain limited disclosures, however, may be continued
for convenience, for such purposes as to make financial information between
years comparative and not misleading. The only question which remains is
the type and extent of disclosure required in each of the particular forms.
This Comment does not presume to answer this question. Questions regarding
the propriety of disclosures need greater evaluation than ad hoc judgments.
Although this Comment does not propose to dismantle the mandatory
disclosure system, some broad guidelines can be proposed. The scheme of
mandatory disclosure currently in force is based on ad hoc, subjective
judgments by SEC lawyers. In most cases, there has been no cost/benefit
or empirical analysis of the need or value of the disclosures. Furthermore,
the quality of the disclosures has been based on the SEC philosophy of
easily understandable disclosure to the individual investor.31 6 Inasmuch as
individual investors do not use these disclosures, relying instead on profes-
sional financial intermediaries, their value is limited. The financial inter-
mediaries are forced to obtain "soft," intangible, and technical information,
which may be excluded from mandatory disclosures. The conflict between
making disclosures simple yet informative would be reduced if the disclosure
requirements addressed themselves to the needs and uses of financial analysts
and sophisticated investors. The financial intermediaries, financial news, and
the market would disseminate the information to the individual investor and
be reflected in the value of the stock. Economic and statistical studies need
to be made to determine the values and costs of disclosures to decide which
are necessary and useful in empirical rather than logical or legal terms. The
disclosure should not be required where the cost of disclosure outweighs the
benefits to investors through the financial intermediaries.
Greater use should be made of self-regulation, in connection with the
determination of the need for particular mandatory disclosures. In the area
of disclosure, financial intermediaries are already obtaining the information
that the market insists upon, whether or not it is included in mandatory
disclosures. Often, management and financial intermediaries are in a superior
position to interpret the need, value, and implications of the information
that a corporation makes available to the market. In addition, self-regulatory
organizations, such as exchanges, independently require certain disclosures
such as timely earnings releases and information about major events. In
evaluating the mandatory disclosure regulations, there is an opportunity for
taking advantage of voluntary disclosures, informational intermediaries, and
self-regulatory organization requirements. A cost/benefit, empirical analysis
again would be necessary to optimize the balance between mandatory dis-
closure and deferring the task of disclosure to other market sources.
316. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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Self-regulation should also be evaluated in other contexts. Self-regulation
is an alternative to deregulation, another currently popular solution to
inefficient governmental regulation. Self-regulation, where possible, offers
certain advantages over direct governmental regulation. The cost of self-
regulation is underwritten by those being regulated, with the result that
resources will flow to where they are most needed, creating better control
at a lower cost to the taxpayer. Since self-regulation is undertaken by
members of the industry, it is more sensitive to the regulatory needs of the
community, whereas governmental regulation is more inflexible. The secu-
rities industry has a two-tiered scheme of regulation in which the SEC
oversees the workings of self-regulatory organizations which have the stat-
utory power to regulate their members. However, the opportunity to rely on
self-regulatory organizations has been underutilized by the SEC, allowing
the self-regulatory organizations to act independently without coordination.
Recent attempts to improve this area have resulted in confusing and over-
lapping standards of responsibility and have resulted in inaction on the part
of both the SEC and the self-regulatory agencies. There should be a greater
attempt to transfer responsibility in the disclosure and other regulatory areas
by the SEC through clearer standards of responsibility and sanctions. As
long as the SEC does not neglect its supervisory role in such a scheme, the
result should be regulation which is more pertinent to industry needs at a
lower cost. 317
Securities regulation also should provide opportunities for greater self-
governance by corporations, by allowing the shareholders to determine the
need for certain disclosures and regulatory requirements. Since much of
the federal securities laws are intended to protect shareholders from cor-
porate management, it is likely that some provisions would not be elected
by shareholders when the cost is considered. Therefore, where it would not
be unreasonable to do so, opportunities for corporations to "opt out" of
certain regulatory requirements by shareholder vote should be made avail-
able.a18
Lastly, the overlapping and duplicative scheme of federal and state
securities regulation needs to be overhauled. The proposed federal scheme,
which would no longer require 1934 Act registrants to register security
offerings, could throw the present structure of state securities laws, which
relies in part on 1933 Act registration requirements, into disarray. A federal
scheme which protects investors in the national markets should not require
additional state regulation. The present system of over fifty different
registration requirements is excessively costly and burdensome to issuers.
317. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
318. See Victor, A Brash Young SEC Commissioner, Nat'l Law J., Nov. 10, 1986, at 30,
col. 2. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT indicated that management is often is a superior
position to interpret the implications of the information that a corporation makes available
to the market. See supra note 79; see also Weiss, Disclosure and Corporate Accountability,
34 Bus. LAW. 575, 590-91 (1979).
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Federal legislation should use the commerce powers and the supremacy
clause to preempt all state securities regulation of registrants under the
federal securities laws.31 9 However, an opportunity for continued state
regulation of companies will exist for those companies which are not
required to register under the federal securities laws. States would continue
to regulate the internal affairs of firms incorporated in their states under
corporate, rather than securities laws principles, which have traditionally
been left to the states. a20 The federal scheme should also develop an
exemption from federal securities laws whereby a company with transaction-
specific and company-specific characteristics under a certain level would
be exempt from federal regulation. The parameters for these exemptions
should be evaluated empirically, using a cost/benefit analysis, and not
based on ad hoc, meaningless standards as are the present exemptions
under the 1933 Act.
X. CONCLUSION
The background of securities legislation, the present legislative scheme,
the failure of patchwork solutions and reform attempts, and the continuing
problems in securities regulation all present the need for comprehensive
legislative reform of securities regulation on a fundamental level. Securities
regulation has traditionally been lawyer's law without a sufficient consid-
eration of economic, financial, accounting, or other disciplines. In order
for the U.S. market to maintain its status and prosper in a growing
international market, securities regulation will need to adapt to the realities
of the market and economic theory. Toward that goal, the Securities Act
of 1933 should be repealed in favor of a continuous scheme of reporting
by companies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The disclosure
and regulatory requirements under this Act should make optimum use of
the market, informational intermediaries,-self-regulatory organizations, and
self-governance by corporations using empirical studies and cost/benefit
analyses. Where mandatory disclosures and government regulation is deemed
necessary, it should be made relevant to the actual needs of users and
beneficiaries. Finally, federal securities laws should preempt state securities
laws which unnecessarily impede the efficiency of the national and inter-
national markets.
319. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. There is already precedent for doing this
under the present statutes. See, e.g., Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642, 644 (1982)
(finding the Illinois Business Takeover Act preempted and unconstitutional under the com-
merce clause).
320. See Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); see also Anderson, The
Meaning of Federalism: Interpreting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70 VA. L. REV.
813, 824 (1984) (discussing Santa Fe and the meaning of federalism in connection with
securities laws); Kitch, A Federal Vision of the Securities Laws, 70 VA. L. REV. 857, 873
(1984) ("[lit makes sense to limit national rules to areas such as securities markets ... and
leave to the states the development of the law governing internal relations within corpora-
tions.").
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Although modern economic theory and empirical studies indicate the
potential for greater deregulation of the securities industry, this proposal
for reform attempts to balance theoretical possibilities with practical real-
ities. Nonetheless, even reform that is practically and theoretically justified
may be difficult. The reforms suggested would simplify the law and increase
competition in the distribution of securities. Such results can hope to
decrease the cost to issuers, investors, and the capital markets in general.
These results are also a threat to an established securities bar and a securities
industry which both rely on revenues from the current, convoluted status
of the law, and therefore, can understandably be expected to show little
interest in major changes. Hopefully, each will realize that the need to
adapt the U.S. market to the needs of a changing environment will be in
their best interests, as well as the capital markets as a whole.
Alfred N. Sacha

